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SILENCING THE "TWITTERING JUROR":
THE NEED TO MODERNIZE PATTERN CAUTIONARY
JURY INSTRUCTIONS TO REFLECT THE REALITIES
OF THE ELECTRONIC AGE
"[I]t becomes painfully evident that the easy access and global reach
of wireless technology is in danger of transforming the jury box into
Pandora's box."'
INTRODUCTION
Today's jurors engage in a variety of "digital misadventures," 2 en-
dangering the sanctity of trial. Generation Y's "just-Google-it-citi-
zens" enter the jury box and change the entire tradition with which
courts are familiar.3 Armed with temptation and capability,4 these ju-
rors are naturally inclined to turn to the Internet when seeking an-
1. John Browning, 'When All That Twitters Is Not Told:' Dangers of the Online Juror-Part 3,
ROCKWALL HERALD BANNER (July 31, 2009), http://rockwallheraldbanner.com/opinion/x144622
9554/-When-All-That-Twitters-Is-Not-Told-Dangers-of-the-online-juror-Part-3 [hereinafter
Browning, Part 3]; see also John G. Browning, When All That Twitters Is Not Told: Dangers of
the Online Juror, 73 TEX. B.J. 216, 219 (2010) [hereinafter Browning, Dangers of the Online
Juror] (noting that courts must catch up with juror use of technology "to prevent jurors from
turning the jury box into a Pandora's box").
2. Hilary Hylton, Tweeting in the Jury Box: A Danger to Fair Trials?, TIME ONLINE (Dec. 29,
2009), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1948971,00.html. Judges and lawyers also
engage in "digital misadventure[s]." Id. See also Michael W. Hoskins, At a Juror's Fingertips:
Legal Community Adapts to an Online World, INDIANA LAw., May-June 2009, at 7, 7-8, availa-
ble at http://www.theindianalawyer.comlhtml/detail-pageImportfram.asp?content=3907. With
respect to judges, the issue arose at a recent annual meeting of the Seventh Circuit Bar Associa-
tion. See id. Judge Richard Posner explained how judges use the Internet to look up informa-
tion not submitted by the parties' attorneys for cases over which they preside. See id. Two cases
exemplify the tendency. In Gilles v. Blanchard, 477 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2007), Judge Posner at-
tached a Google satellite photo of the location at issue in the case-something that was not
included in the original record. Id. at 469; see also Hoskins, supra, at 7. In United States v. Boyd,
475 F.3d 875 (7th Cit. 2007), the panel opinion expressed frustration that "no satellite photo ...
was placed in evidence," so the judges found one themselves. Id.
3. Hylton, supra note 2. Generation Y is also known as the "Millennium Generation." Ellen
Neuborne & Kathleen Kerwin, Generation Y, Bus. WK., Feb. 15, 1999, at 80, 82, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99_07/b3616001.htm. Generation Y represents those born
between 1979 and 1994. Hylton, supra note 2. The Chicago Tribune reports that Generation
Y-also dubbed "Millennials"-is "history's first 'always connected' generation, treating phones
and similar devices almost like body parts." Duaa Eldeib, 'Millennials': The Greatest (Con-
nected) Generation, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 24, 2010, at 9.
4. Jurors are likely to enter the courthouse "digitally linked to the outside world." Ralph
Artigliere et al., Reining in Juror Misconduct: Practical Suggestions for Judges and Lawyers, 84
FLA. B.J. 8, 10 (2010).
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swers to their questions. Don't understand the evidence presented at
trial? Just Google it.5 Can't grasp a complicated subject? Wikipedia
can simplify it.6 Need to locate the site of a witness's alibi or the scene
of the crime? Turn to Mapquest.7 Is the lawyer's description of the
plaintiff's medical condition too complicated? Generation Y's jurors
can search WebMD.8
For several years now, Internet-centered juror misconduct has been
on the rise. 9 Amidst the tedium of trial, with iPhones in their pocket
and laptops by their sides, Generation Y's jurors browse the In-
ternet.10 But a new form of "digital misadventure" has become a phe-
nomenon in America's courtrooms. Jurors are using social
networking-Twitter and Facebook-to share their jury experience in
real time." These services, particularly Twitter, have "unsuspected
depth."I 2
Twitter is the new face of "the 'super fresh' Web."13 It combines
two dangerous elements: access to outside information and conversa-
tion.14 Twitter poses a threatening alternative to Google's near mo-
nopoly on Web searching and provides users immediate access to
immense volumes of information. Moreover, "[r]apid-fire innova-
tion" has redesigned Twitter to approximate in-person conversation.1 5
5. See Christopher Danzig, Mobile Misdeeds: When Jurors Have the Web at Their Fingertips,
Trials Can Quickly Unravel, INSIDE COUNSEL, June 2009, at 38, 40 (quoting DLA Piper Partner
Jeffery Rosenfeld: "You've got jurors who could literally be sitting in the [jury] box running an
Internet search while testimony is going on"). The practice of jurors running Internet searches
during trial has been dubbed the "Google mistrial[ ]" when it requires post-verdict relief. Renee
Loth, Op-Ed., Mistrial by Google, Bos. GLOBE ONLINE (Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.boston.com/
bostonglobe/editorial-opinion/oped/articles/2009/11/06/mistrial-by-google.
6. See Hylton, supra note 2.
7. See Hoskins, supra note 2.
8. See, e.g., Loth, supra note 5.
9. See Artigliere et al., supra note 4.
10. See generally Hoskins, supra note 2.
11. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 2. In the U.K., a woman was dismissed from a jury for posting
a poll on her Facebook profile that asked others to help her reach her decision in the child
abduction and sexual assault case she was serving on. Browning, Dangers of the Online Juror,
supra note 1, at 217. Similar incidents have occurred in the United States. Id.
12. Steven Johnson, How Twitter Will Change the Way We Live (in 140 Characters or Less),
TIME, June 15, 2009, at 32, 33.
13. Id. at 35. The author aptly points out, "If you're looking for interesting articles or sites
devoted to Kobe Bryant, you search Google. If you're looking for interesting comments from
your extended social network about the three-pointer Kobe just made 30 seconds ago, you go to
Twitter." Id. Due to this immediacy, Twitter might be even more problematic to courts than
Google; Twitter allows jurors to gather immediate responses to their questions. See id.
14. See id. at 32-35.
15. Id. at 34. 37.
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Jurors no longer just share their experiences with people outside the
courtroom: they now can view outsiders' responses as well.16
With instantaneous access to the Internet, old cautionary prohibi-
tions-such as barring jurors from "outside research" or "external dis-
cussion"-are no longer specific enough.17 Jurors are rightfully
confused as to whether these instructions apply to their phones and
computers as well.18 With ambiguous instruction from the court, ju-
rors continue to access the Web, potentially encountering outside in-
formation and being exposed to extraneous influence. 19
Unsurprisingly, juror use of modern technology has been "hit[ting
courts] right over the head." 20 Accounts of technology-influenced ju-
ror misconduct made headlines in 2009.21 Jurors are imperiling the
integrity of trial by using mobile devices in the jury box.2 2 Generation
Y's "Blackberry-addicted jurors,"23 with their instinctual drive to stay
"connected" and constant ability to hop online, make it increasingly
necessary for judges to proactively prevent online interference with
16. Id. at 34.
17. This is the traditional precautionary instruction given to jurors by the judge at the begin-
ning of a trial. See, e.g., Third Circuit, Pattern Jury Instruction 1.3, available at http://
www.ca3.uscourts.gov/civiljuryinstructions/Final-Instructions/november2009/1 Chaps_1_2_3
2009_November.pdf. A cautionary instruction is "[a] judge's instruction for the jury not to be
influenced by outside factors and not to talk to anyone about the case while the trial is in pro-
gress." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 874 (8th ed. 2004). These instructions are designed to pre-
vent juror misconduct. Juror misconduct is defined as
[a] juror's violation of the court's charge or the law, committed either during trial or in
deliberations after trial, such as (1) communicating about the case with outsiders, wit-
nesses, attorneys, bailiffs, or judges, (2) bringing into the jury room information relat-
ing to the case but not in evidence, and (3) conducting experiments regarding theories
of the case outside the court's presence.
Id. at 1019.
18. See, e.g., Dustin Bartholomew, An Interview with the Juror "Who Tweets," FAYETTEVILLE
FLYER (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.fayettevilleflyer.com/auther/DustinBartholomew.
19. See, e.g., James A. Edwards, Jurors Who Tweet, Blog, & Surf-Deciding and Discussing
Your Case, JD SUPRA (July 2009), http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=60c1
8d09-7f61-477a-902b-5ae4O5f5dcd9.
20. John Browning, 'When All that Twitters is Not Told: Dangers of the Online Juror' (Part 1),
ROCKWALL HERALD BANNER (May 15, 2009), http://rockwellheraldbanner.com/opinion/x105452
2581/-when-all-that-twitters-is-not-told-Dangers-of-online-juror-part-1? [hereinafter Browning,
Dangers]. For an overview of the issues posed by technology in the jury box, see Douglas L.
Keene & Rita Handrich, The Darkside of the Internet: In the Jury Room, Am. C. TRIAL LAWS.
(2009), http://www.keenetrial.com/articles_15_2510325171.pdf.
21. See, e.g., John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Google and Twitter, Mistrials Are Popping Up,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at Al.
22. See, e.g., id.
23. Ahnalese Rushmann, Courtroom Coverage in 140 Characters, 33 NEWS MEDIA & L. 28, 30
(2009).
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trials.24 The volume of information available online has become a
"near-irresistible magnet for juror curiosity."25
"[T]echnology has far outpaced the court rules." 2 6 Generation Y's
unchecked Internet usage puts America's trials at risk. Mobile In-
ternet devices threaten our adversary system of trial procedure be-
cause they enable jurors to immediately access information from
outside the courtroom.27 With the reach of the Internet in the palm of
a juror's hands, the situation is exacerbated by immediacy. 28 Judges
must ensure jurors consider only the evidence provided in court.2 9
While all juror Internet access potentially poses a threat to trial in-
tegrity, a focused discussion of Twitter is pertinent due to the Web
site's newfound fame. Juror Internet use has endangered trials for al-
most a decade, but networking Web sites pose the newest threat. 30 In
2009, the use of Twitter became the new "hot topic" in civil procedure
and evidence law.3 ' Twitter presents to judges, litigants, and lawyers a
new variation on an old problem: juror communication with people
outside the courtroom and access to extraneous information.
To the dismay of the legal profession, Twitter has gained an alarm-
ing presence in the jury box. 3 2 Since only an estimated six percent of
lawyers and judges use Twitter, a brief overview of the Web site's na-
ture is in order.33 Twitter is more of an "information network" 34 than
24. See generally Edwards, supra note 19.
25. Michael Hoenig, Juror Misconduct on the Internet, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 8, 2009, at 3.
26. Tresa Baldas, For Jurors in Michigan, No Tweeting (or Texting, or Googling Allowed),
NAT'L L.J. (July 1, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431952628&hbx
login=1 (quoting Josh Marquis).
27. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 21, at Al.
28. See Danzig, supra note 5, at 38; see also Duchess Harris, Courts Wrangle with Twittering
Jurors, LITIG. NEWS (July 15, 2009), http://abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/topstories/twitter-
jurors.html.
29. Excluding extraneous information from juror deliberations is one of the goals of the ad-
versary system. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b). While the Internet has been causing problems for
courts since 2001, the dramatic rise in frequency of use has peaked the attention of experts. See
Keene & Handrich, supra note 20, at 1.
30. The Twittering juror issue first infiltrated courts in 2009. See United States v. Fumo, 639 F.
Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
31. The volume of professor, lawyer, and judge blog commentary on the Twittering juror ex-
emplifies the issue's rising fame. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Kroll, Michigan Jurors Prohibited from
Using Electronic Communications, Ctl. ACCIDENT AND INJURY LAW. BLOG (July 2, 2009), http://
chicagoaccidentinjurylawyer.com/2009/07/michigan-jurors-prohibitedjfro.html (a lawyer's post-
ing regarding new jury instructions proposed in Michigan).
32. To view the prevalence of jury duty on Twitter, simply go to http://www.twitter.com and
type "jury duty" into the search field. The results will show, in reverse chronological order, the
most recent tweets about jury duty.
33. Rosalind R. Greene & Jan Mills Spaeth, Are Tweeters or Googlers in Your Jury Box?, 46
ARIz. Arr'y, Feb. 2010, 38, 39.
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a social network. 35 It is a microblogging service on the Internet.36
The service poses to users one question-"What's happening? "-to
which the text-based answer (a "tweet") can be up to 140 characters in
length.37 Users can post tweets for others to read, respond directly to
other users' tweets, and share Internet links.38 Twitter accepts
messages from the Short Message Service (SMS), 39 the Web, and in-
stant message services. 40 Due to its accessibility from various delivery
systems, Twitter is extremely powerful.41 It has become a popular
method for people to share and discover what is happening in real
time.42
34. Interview by John Battelle with Evan Williams, CEO, Twitter (Oct. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p5jXcgZnEa0&fmt=18 (quoting Twitter's founder Evan
Williams).
35. Stuart Dredge, "Twitter Is Not a Social Network," Says VP, MOBILE ENTERTAINMENT FOR
EVERYONE IN MOBILE CONTENT (Sept. 14, 2010), http://www.mobile-ent.biz/news/38640/Twitter-
is-not-a-social-network-says-Twitter-VP.
36. See TwITTER: ABOUT, http://twitter.comlabout#about (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). A blog,
the contraction of the term "weblog," AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 155 (4th ed.
2004), is a "personal [W]eb[ ]site on which the individual records opinions, links to other sites,
etc. on a regular basis." CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 147 (11th ed. 2008). A blog
functions as an online personal journal with reflections, comments, and often hyperlinks to re-
lated information. See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY 157 (Anges ed. 2008).
Twitter is a microblog. See, e.g., Leslie D'Monte, Swine Flu's Tweet Tweet Causes Online Flutter,
Bus. STANDARD (Apr. 29, 2009, 4:03 PM), http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/swine-
flu%255Cs-tweet-tweet-causes-online-flutter/356604/. A microblog consists of "short posts to a
personal blog," focusing particularly on "happenings of the moment." Microblog, DICTIONARY.
coM, http://dictionary.reference.combrowse/microblogging (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
37. See TwirrER, http://www.twitter.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
38. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 12, at 34.
39. Short Message Service is a communication service that allows the interchange of short text
messages over mobile networks. Puneet Gupta, Short Message Service: What, How and Where?,
WIRELESS DEVELOPER NETWORK, http://www.wirelessdevnet.com/channels/sms/features/sms.
html. Twitter is often called the "SMS of the Internet." D'Monte, supra note 36.
40. See TwIrER: ABOUT, supra note 36. Users do not necessarily expect a response when
they tweet:
On the receiving end, Twitter is ambient-updates from your friends and relatives float
to your phone, IM, or web site and you are expected to pay as much or as little atten-
tion to them as you see fit. The result of using Twitter to stay connected with friends,
relatives, and coworkers is that you have a sense of what folks are up to[,] but you are
not expected to respond to any messages unless you want to. This means you can site
in and out of the flow of information as it suits you.. . . Twitter is what you make of it-
receive a lot of information . . . or just a tiny bit.
Isn't Twitter Just Too Much Information?, TwiTTER, http://twitter.comlabout#about (last visited
Jan. 25, 2011).
41. Sarah Milstein, How Twitter Can Help at Work, N.Y. TIMES SHIFTING CAREERS BLOG
(Sept. 7, 2008, 9:01 PM), http://shiftingcarreers.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/how-twitter-can-
help-at-work/.
42. Users can either subscribe to follow others' tweets or conduct a general search. See Ed-
wards, supra note 19, at 5. Jurors communicate on Twitter with both friends and strangers. See
id.
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"Courtroom coverage in 140 characters" has been disrupting court
proceedings across the country. 43 Jurors are "in ur [sic] jury box,
tweetin [sic] ur [sic] verdict."44 Cases in 2009 illustrated how "thumb-
nimble" 45 jurors use Twitter to gather information about a case or to
share current jury service experiences. 46 The media accurately de-
scribed these Twittering jurors as "wreaking havoc on trials around
the country." 47 The crux of the problem is the ability of the Twittering
juror to access outside information and to be swayed by extraneous
influence.
Juror use of Twitter during trial is problematic because the judicial
process depends upon an impartial jury, unexposed to extraneous in-
fluence. 48 With the ability of an in-court juror to receive comments on
his tweets from people outside the courtroom, the problem of the
Twittering juror parallels the problems posed by communication with
outsiders in general. Access to outside information threatens the
sanctity of trial.49 To ensure a fair trial, courts must preemptively con-
trol Twitter use by jurors; courts must "silenc[e] . .. the tweets."50
The Twittering juror could be silenced with a simple jury instruc-
tion. The traditional prohibition against external communication and
outside research must be rewritten to meet the demands of the
twenty-first century. Courts should adopt a standard jury instruction
that prevents juror use of technology-including Twitter-during trial.
The new instruction must specifically detail which technologies jurors
are prohibited from using.51 It should incorporate the policy reason
for the prohibition to contextualize forbidden behavior for jurors. 52
The instruction should be provided to jurors orally and in written
43. Rushmann, supra note 23, at 28.
44. Lance Turner, Morning News: Twittering Juror Prompts Request for New Trial, WORD-
PRESS.COM (Mar. 13, 2009), http://lanceturner.wordpress.com/2009/03/13/morning-morning-
news-twittering-juror-prompts-request-for-new-trial/. For an interesting discussion on when
tweeting has and has not been allowed in the courtroom, see Richard M. Goehler et al., The
Legal Case for Twitter in the Courtroom, 27 COMM. LAw., Apr. 2010, at 14 (detailing when courts
have allowed reporters and jurors to use Twitter and when they have not).
45. Patrik Jonsson, Tweets from the Jury Box: Jurors Using Twitter Jeopardize Trials, CHRIS-
TIAN ScL. MONITOR (Oct. 21, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2009/1021/p02s26-
usju.html.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Fumo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 544, 555 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
47. Schwartz, supra note 21, at Al.
48. Twitter could potentially bring extraneous prejudicial material into the courtroom. If
courts leave jurors' access to extraneous information unchecked, then the uninformed citizen
might be allowed to dictate the judgment, rather than the informed juror.
49. This is the premise behind Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).
50. Baldas, supra note 26.
51. See infra notes 233-63 and accompanying text.
52. See infra notes 264-77 and accompanying text.
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form to emphasize the importance of the prohibition. 53 The precau-
tionary instruction should be issued repeatedly throughout trial. It
should be used in combination with other preventative techniques,
such as juror summons, voir dire questioning, and juror declarations.54
This Comment addresses the problem of the Twittering juror and
seeks to persuade courts to prohibit tweeting. It suggests a prevent-
ative measure: a new jury instruction satisfying the above criteria.
Part II examines juror use of Twitter and discusses the relevant law
and policy considerations for evaluating Twitter as an extraneous in-
fluence.55 Part III summarizes recent court decisions concerning Twit-
ter use, evaluates approaches currently underway for regulating
Twitter use in court, and proposes a new preventative jury instruction
that will correct the current approaches' flaws.56 Part IV considers
how courts and juries will be affected by the new instruction.57 Part V
provides a brief conclusion on the issue and makes predictions for the
future.58
II. BACKGROUND
The Twittering juror became a legal concern in 2009.59 Against a
background of Internet-centered juror misconduct, Twitter arose as a
new rendition of a recognized problem. 60 An examination of the pop-
ularity of Twitter, its threat to the adversary system, and 2009's Twit-
tering juror cases provide foundation for the development of a
preventative solution.
A. Technology in the Jury Box: A Threat to Trial Procedure
Twitter provides a focused avenue to discuss juror use of technol-
ogy. The problem is a pressing one: Twitter's statistical popularity
makes it increasingly likely that a juror will be a Twittering one. With
53. See infra notes 278-88 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 302-20 and accompanying text.
55. See infra notes 59-170 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 171-320 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 321-34 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 335-51 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., Hylton, supra note 2.
60. See generally Johnson, supra note 12, at 37. An April 2009 survey by the Pew Research
Center's Internet & American Life Project shows that fifty-six percent of American adults access
the Internet daily by wireless means. Press Release, Pew Internet and American Life Project,
Mobile Internet Use Increases Sharply in 2009 as More than Half of All Americans Have Gotten
Online by Some Wireless Means (July 22, 2009), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/Press-
Releases/2009/Mobile-internet-use.aspx. Nearly one-fifth of Americans use a mobile device to
access the Internet everyday. Id. Thirty-nine percent have used a laptop computer to access the
Internet. Id.
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the need to maintain the integrity of jury deliberations, courts must
tame this threat to trial procedure.
1. Twitter as an Information and Social Network
Twitter's popularity has increased as mobile technologies-such as
the BlackBerry and the iPhone-have become more widespread. 61
As most United States courtrooms do not confiscate jurors' mobile
devices when they enter the courthouse, 62 jurors can access these de-
vices at any point during trial. Jurors are increasingly using their mo-
bile devices to social network from the jury box.6 3 This is a natural
extension of Generation Y's habitual desire to stay connected.
Online social networking has become so common that, for a large
sector of the population, it has become instinctual.64 Statistics illumi-
nate the popularity of social networking. Thirty-five percent of adult
Internet users currently use a social networking Web site. 65 Twitter
was the third most popular site in January 2009, with six million
monthly visitors and a total of almost fifty-five million monthly vis-
its.66 Twitter's year-over-year growth rate from February 2008 to Feb-
ruary 2009 was 1382%.67 As of February 2009, Twitter is the fastest-
growing Web site in the "member communities" category of Nielsen
Media.68 Interestingly, Twitter's popularity stems mostly from the
adult population.69 This differs from other social networking Web
sites, such as Facebook, that draw a younger following.70
61. See id.
62. See Hylton, supra note 2 ("[M]any judges are still loath to separate jurors from their cell
phones and Blackberries . . . ."); Charles Wilson, Texting, Tweeting Tempt Jurors, Frustrate
Judges, AssoCIATED PRESS ONLINE (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.wsbt.com/news/nationall
52234872.html.
63. See Browning, Part 3, supra note 1.
64. See Trish Renaud, Watch out for Blogging Jurors, LAW TECH. NEWS (Feb. 17, 2009), http://
www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/pubArticleLT.jspid=1202428284825.
65. Sharon Jayson, Older Adults Among Newer Members on Social Networking Sites,
USATODAY.COM (Jan. 14, 2009, 6:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.cim/tech/hotsites/2009-01-14-so-
cial-networkingN.htm.
66. Andy Kazeniac, Social Networks: Facebook Takes Over Top Spot, Twitter Climbs, COM-
PETE BLoG (Feb. 9, 2009), http://blog.compete.com/2009/02/09/facebook-myspace-twitter-social-
network/.
67. Michelle McGiboney, Twitter's Tweet Smell of Success, NEILSEN WIRE (Mar. 18, 2009),
http://blog.neilsenonline-mobile/twitters-tweet-smell-of-success/.
68. Id.
69. See Claire Cain Miller, Twitter? That's So, Like, for Grown-Ups, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26,
2009, at B1.
70. Id.
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As Twitter use has flourished-as of March 2004 there were an esti-
mated two hundred and twenty-five million tweets per day 1-it was
inevitable that Twitter use would spill over into inappropriate environ-
ments such as the courtroom. Twitter user Keith Anderson, for exam-
ple, tweeted: "Wow. Jury duty. First time ever. Can I be excused
because I can't be offline for that long?" 72
The prevalence of jurors who tweet during trial is truly astounding.
A simple search of the phrase "jury duty" on the Twitter Web site
retrieves thousands of "hits."73 While the majority of tweets are sim-
ple emotional reactions to receiving a jury summons, a large number
of tweets recount details of ongoing trials.74 Twittering jurors serve as
citizen journalists, publishing comments on their jury service experi-
ence on the Web.75 "Tweets are a part of everyday life, and this is
what [jurors are] doing."76 Tweeting from the jury box potentially al-
lows extraneous information to enter deliberations.
2. Twitter Poses a Threat to Trial Integrity Due to a Twitter User's
Ability to Access Outside Information and Potential to Be
Swayed by Extraneous Influence
Like juror use of other Web sites, Twitter use potentially com-
promises the integrity of trial for litigants. This is because it conflicts
with the traditional notion of the adversary system: to keep jurors in-
sulated from outside information.77 American trials are conducted us-
71. Robert A. Clifford, Twittering in the Jury Box, 32 CHI. LAw., June 2009, at 16, 17; Gina F.
Rubel, Is Twitter a Valuable Networking Tool or Just for the Birds?, THE NAT'L LAW JOURNAL
(Mar. 18, 2009), http://www.1aw.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202429165569&slreturn=1&
hbxlogin=1.
72. Erin Geiger Smith, Today's Top Tweets from Jury Duty: I Need My Twitter, Bus. INSIDER
L. REV. (Oct. 14, 2009, 1:54 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/todays-top-tweets-from jury-
duty-2009-10#i-need-my-twitter-7.
73. See TwIrrER, supra note 37 (type "jury duty" into the search box).
74. See Smith, supra note 72.
75. See Eugene Volokh, Federal Rules Interpreted as Barring Twitter Coverage of Trial from
Inside Courtroom, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 9, 2009, 12:09 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/
11/09/federal-rules-interpreted-as-barring-twitter-coverage-of-trial-from-courtroom/.
76. Hoskins, supra note 2 (quoting Chief Judge Robert Miller of the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Indiana who said he has begun adapting his instructions in recent
months to prohibit juror use of Twitter).
77. See RANDOLPH N. JONAKAIT, THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM 199 (2003). The court will
instruct jurors "that they should consider only the evidence presented at trial and not other
information." Id. For example,
To help ensure that the jurors consider only the presented evidence, jurors will be told
[via jury instruction] to restrict their behavior outside the courtroom during the course
of trial: they should not talk to anyone about the case; they should avoid news coverage
about the trial; and they should not otherwise seek out information about the matter.
Id.
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ing the adversary system.78  In the adversary system, the
decisionmakers are to be neutral and passive. 79 As decisionmakers,
the members of the jury are supposed to be "passive receiver[s] of
information."80 The information presented to jurors in the courtroom
is "selected, managed, and controlled by the parties and their attor-
neys."8' Jurors are not to obtain information from any outside
source.82
Judges instruct jurors to decide the case based on the facts and evi-
dence presented before them in court, in light of reason, common
sense, and experience.83 This instruction is intended to ensure that
extraneous prejudicial information does not enter the jury's delibera-
tions.8 4 While jurors are permitted to take into account their back-
grounds and experiences, they are not allowed to use evidence from
outside the courtroom-extraneous information-in the decision-
making process.85 While not all outside information is necessarily
"prejudicial," 86 our system nevertheless tries to eliminate it. The pos-
sibility of prejudice necessitates employing a strict preventative mea-
sure to uphold fairness and due process. 7
The Federal Rules of Evidence demonstrate that the use of extrane-
ous information in deliberations is a serious matter. Typically, jurors
may not testify about and courts may not inquire into the deliberation
process.88 However, the Rules provide three exceptions to the gen-
eral premise.89 The court can inquire into any extraneous information
78. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 1 (1984).
79. See JONAKAIT, supra note 77, at 172.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 175.
82. See id. Jurors are to consider "only the presented evidence." Id. at 199.
83. See, e.g., MINNESOTA JUDICIAL BRANCH, HANDBOOK FOR PETIT JURORS, available at
http://www.mncourts.gov/district/4/?page=747 (explaining the responsibilities of a juror).
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. Only juror exposure to prejudicial, outside information will elicit judicial response. See
generally Martha L. Arias, INTERNET LAW - Does Jurors' Access to Extraneous Information
on the Internet Support a Motion for a New Trial?, INTERNET Bus. L. SERVICES BLOG (May 5,
2010), http://www.ibls.com/internet lawnews-portal-view.aspx?s=latestnews&id=2331. When
evaluating whether access to outside information would merit a new trial, a judge must deter-
mine (1) whether the access was frivolous, and if not, (2) whether the access actually occurred,
and if so, (3) whether the access was prejudicial. Wilgus v. F/V Sirius, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 23,
24-25 (D. Me. 2009); see also United States v. Bristol-MArtir, 570 F.3d 29, 42 (1st Cir. 2009).
87. See Artigliere et al., supra note 4, at 12.
88. FED. R. EvID. 606(b).
89. See id. The rule reads in the relevant part as follows:
(b) Inquiry Into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of
a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring
during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or
any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from
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or outside influence that is brought to a juror's attention.90 If the ex-
traneous information or outside influence is found to have prejudi-
cially affected the jury verdict, then the court can impeach the
verdict. 91
When a court determines that extraneous information has entered
deliberations, it must then determine whether the information is prej-
udicial.92 If prejudicial, there may be the need for a new trial; if not
prejudicial, the verdict may be allowed to stand. In deciding whether
extraneous information is prejudicial, courts rely on a number of pre-
sumptions. A presumption of prejudice arises when a juror privately
communicates about a case with a third party who is associated with
the case or who has an interest in the outcome of the case.93 The
presumption of prejudice is applied to immunize the trial against the
"frailties of the jury." 94
Legal practitioners and scholars aptly argue that the presumption of
prejudice that applies to in-person communication applies to other
the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection
therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) whether extraneous prejudicial informa-
tion was improperly brought to the jury's attention, (2) whether any outside influence
was improperly brought to bear upon any juror ....
Id.
90. Id. The extent and level of inquiry into an allegation of juror misconduct is left to the
discretion of each district or trial court judge. See, e.g., United States v. Gaston-Brito, 64 F.3d
11, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1995). However, "[a] court has a basic obligation to investigate and evaluate
alleged juror misconduct." 75B AM. JUR. 2d Trial § 1392 (2007).
91. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 121 (1987) (interpreting Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 606(b) to prohibit juror testimony to impeach a verdict unless the testimony is regarding
extraneous prejudicial information). "[Tlhe judge must assess [the taint-producing event's]
probable effect on an average juror without regard, given the strictures of Rule 606(b), for the
event's actual effect on particular jury deliberations." Wilgus, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 25 n.3 (citing
United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 262 (1st Cir. 1990)).
92. What constitutes extraneous, prejudicial information is debated. For an overview of the
debate, see Brian W. Reidy, Comment, No Jury Rigging in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit: An Analysis of Juror Testimony to Impeach Jury Verdicts, 4 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 428,
445-50 (2009). A general rule some courts use is to assess the probable effect of the "taint-
producing event" on a "hypothetical average juror." Wilgus, 665 F. Supp. 2d. at 25 n.3 (quoting
Boylan, 898 F.2d at 262).
93. See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) ("[Any private communication,
contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending
before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial .... ); United States v.
O'Brien, 972 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1992) ("Any unauthorized private communication between
jurors and persons associated with the case is presumptively prejudicial, unless its harmlessness
is or becomes apparent."); see also Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 (1966).
94. See Edward T. Swaine, Pre-Deliberations Juror Misconduct, Evidential Incompetence, and
Juror Responsibility, 98 YALE L.J. 187, 187 (1988). Another scholar similarly argues that "[t]he
rules of evidence represent the most careful attempt to control the processes of communication
to be found outside a laboratory." Edward W. Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicat-
ing, 5 VAND. L. REV. 277, 282 (1951).
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mechanisms of communication as well.9 5 Scholars contend that the
new format of communication mechanisms should not affect how
these presumptions apply to new technologies such as e-mail, instant
messaging, or mobile phones.96 These scholars rationalize that even if
"impersonal," these communications still involve the exchange and re-
ceipt of a great deal of information.97 Because the goal of the system
is to eliminate juror access to outside information, the presumption of
prejudice must apply to modern technologies as well.
Any form of communication with a third party-whether by speak-
ing, writing, texting, blogging, or tweeting-should result in a pre-
sumption of prejudice because all forms of communication have the
potential to "disrupt the integrity of the proceeding." 98 All forms of
communication that subject a juror to extraneous information have
the potential to be prejudicial. 99 An even stronger case can be made
for omitting extraneous information gained through modern technolo-
gies. 00 Two main reasons exist: (1) the greater reach of modern tech-
nology increases the likelihood that jurors will encounter prejudicial
information, and (2) people in today's world tend to find the use of
technology so instinctive that they are likely to forget that their ser-
vice is confidential. 101 These two reasons apply to most Internet Web
sites, including Twitter.
95. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, How Blogging Affects Legal Proceedings, N.Y. L.J.
(May 13, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/nylj/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202430647333&hbxlogin=1
("A presumption of prejudice arises where a juror speaks with a third party about the case or
communicates with any person who is associated with, or has an interest in, the outcome of the
case." (citing O'Brien, 972 F.2d at 14)). Communication naturally incorporates electronic corre-
spondence. See id. This is an essential development of the law as "[t]echnology has made juror
misconduct a more common issue than it used to be." Susan Brenner, Jury Misconduct and
Technology, CYB3RCRIM3 (Mar. 18, 2009, 3:19 PM), http://cyb3rcrim3.blogspot.com/2009/03/
juror-misconduct-and-technology.html. The ease with which a juror has the ability to commit
misconduct is readily apparent. "It used to be that to conduct their own investigations jurors had
to go to the crime scene or to the library or otherwise take affirmative action in the real-world
outside the courtroom. Now, though, they can use the Internet to look up information." Id.
This easy access makes it increasingly likely jurors will encounter prejudicial information. See id.
It makes the decision of whether or not access to outside information that is presumptively
prejudicial more important.
96. See, e.g., Raysman & Brown, supra note 95.
97. See, e.g., id. This is especially true of blogging and tweeting, which allow readers to "post
comments or images to foster an open forum of lively discussion." Id.
98. Id. ("[R]ecent evidence suggests that blog posts and other electronic communications by
jurors about ongoing trials can potentially disrupt the integrity of the proceedings.").
99. See generally id.
100. See Johnson, supra note 12, at 36-37.
101. See id. Douglas Keene aptly describes the "addictive hold" that electronic communica-
tion has on many jurors. Douglas Keene, Panic on Tweet Street: "Without Twitter, I Felt Jittery
and Naked," THE JURY Room (Aug. 7, 2009), www.keenetrial.com/blog/2009/08 ("Some [Twit-
ter] 'users' panicked as much as you might have expected from drug addicts. Users were 'jittery,'
192
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The pure reach of the Internet increases the chance that users will
encounter prejudicial information. Access to information on the In-
ternet is ubiquitous. 102 If a juror's brief Internet search reveals infor-
mation that was not provided during trial, jurors will likely become
especially suspicious of the court's authority. 103 Allowing juror use of
the Internet enables jurors to maintain their skepticism of author-
ity.104 With access to the Web, jurors are less willing to assume that
the judge and attorneys are presenting them with everything that they
need to decide a case.105 Because jurors often are unaware of the
need to keep certain types of information out of court, they view the
withholding as erroneous, not proper.106 Banning modern technology
will prevent juror mistrust of the court.107
Like other technologies, Twitter allows information to go both in
and out of the courtroom. Information flowing in is more trouble-
some than information flowing out. 08 This is because it exposes the
jury to outside information and leaves the juror potentially subject to
extraneous influence. However, "[i]nformation flowing out of the jury
box can . . . [put a juror] on a collision course with the law" as well.10 9
Jury consultant Douglas Keene explains several reasons why this is
so. 110 For one, allowing jurors to use the Internet for any purpose
"leads to a 'lowered social barrier of self-disclosure' among jurors.""'
'naked,' [and] 'freaked out."'). The author notes that for those not drawn to social networking
Web sites, the reactions "seem frankly bizarre." Id. However, the reactions are becoming in-
creasingly normal as the Internet is becoming "a place where [people] conduct their lives or a
portion of their lives." Id.
102. See Douglas L. Keene & Rita R. Handrich, Online and Wired for Justice: Why Jurors
Turn to the Internet, 21 JURY EXPERT 14, 14 (2009), available at http://www.astcweb.org/public/
publication/documents/Keene%200nline%20&%2oWired%20TJE%20Nov20091.pdf.
103. Hilary Hylton notes that jurors today are skeptical of authority. See Hylton, supra note
2.
104. Juror's are skeptical of the court because it is "a place and a system they know little
about, except through cultural sources." Artigliere et al., supra note 4, at 9. A generation that is
"'totally unused to sitting and listening but is using technology"' will change our jury system.
Hylton, supra note 2 (quoting Sir Igor Judge).
105. See Hylton, supra note 2 ("[T]oday's jurors want to see the supporting evidence in
detail.").
106. See Adam Worcester, Jurors' Tweets, Texts Upset Trial Judge, PORTLAND Bus. J. ONLINE
(Sept. 23, 2009), http://portland.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2009/09/21/focus2.html?b=1253
505600%5E2119281 ("The problem, many observers agree, is that jurors don't fully understand
judges' admonishments about maintaining strict confidentiality. Indeed, many jurors believe
they're doing their duty by using the Internet to more fully investigate a case . . . .").
107. See id. (noting that when jurors find extraneous information online they "wonder why
they're only hearing part of the story from lawyers").
108. Cf Schwartz, supra note 21, at Al.
109. Id.
110. See Hylton, supra note 2.
111. Id. (quoting Douglas Keene).
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This disrupts traditional adversary proceedings because jurors are
more likely to search for information about the case or disclose infor-
mation to others about it. Injecting Twitter into a proceeding "funda-
mentally change[s] the rules of engagement. It . . . [brings] a wider
audience into what [would] have been a private exchange."1 12
The Twittering juror is thus a modern extension of the general is-
sues posed by juror access to outside information. While the threat
used to come from access to books, magazines, and in-person conver-
sations, the Internet has broadened the scope of information accessi-
ble to jurors and their ability to talk with others.113 All Internet
search engines, including Twitter, should be considered presumptively
prejudicial. 114 This is especially true of Twitter because of its nature,
which combines three dangerous elements of the Internet together:
social networks, live searching,"i5 and link sharing."16
By treating juror use of Twitter as presumptively prejudicial, courts
would be required to grant post-verdict relief if they discovered a
Twittering juror. When taking into account the statistical popularity
of Twitter, this could potentially entail an enormous expenditure of
judicial resources. To dampen the Twittering jurors' likelihood of af-
fecting trials, a preventative solution is preferable.117 A jury instruc-
tion should be created to silence the Twittering juror.
112. Johnson, supra note 12, at 34. "Now a juror can communicate with thousands of people
with one click . . . ." Greene & Spaeth, supra note 33, at 39.
113. See Worcester, supra note 106 ("And armed with unprecedented access to encyclopedic
information, [jurors] can search the Web for details about plaintiffs and defendants during lunch
hour or even bathroom breaks.").
114. See Kroll, supra note 31 (noting "'research' taints the judicial process").
115. Twi-rER, supra note 37. The Web site prompts visitors to search for a term in order to
"See what's happening-right now." Id.
116. Johnson, supra note 12, at 35. The "cocktail ... poses what may amount to the most
interesting alternative to Google's .. .searching." Id. "Twitter is a more efficient supplier of the
super-fresh Web than Google." Id.
117. While not the subject of this Comment, remedial concerns are also an issue. If juror
misconduct is found to have occurred, courts must determine "'whether the jurors' shenanigans
during the trial actually had an impact on the verdict."' Portable Technology Causing Trouble in
Courtrooms, WIsN.coM (Feb. 5, 2010, 12:03 PM), http://www.wisn.comlnews/22466309/de-
tail.html (quoting Milwaukee County Court Judge Rick Sankovitz). The court must determine
whether to take remedial measures. See, e.g., infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the court's evaluation of juror Powell's tweeting to determine whether Stoam's motion
for a mistrial should be granted).
In evaluating whether courts should take remedial measures, the judge looks to the specific
facts of the case. "Nothing necessarily makes Twittering a problem any different than other
forms of communication." Scott Michels, Cases Challenged over "Tweeting" Jurors: Lawyers Say
They Will Appeal Verdicts After Jurors Comment on Facebook, Twitter, ABC NEWS (Mar. 17,
2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=7095018&page=1 (paraphrasing lawyer and
jury consultant Anne Reed). Courts should approach the issue the same as if whatever was said
through Twitter was said offline. See id.
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B. Twitter and Its Twitterers: How Twitter has Entered the
Jury Box" 8
While many jurors understand the problem with turning to outside
sources for information, they may not understand that this prohibition
applies to Internet access.119 Due to the prevalence of technology in
everyday life, jurors might not realize that gathering and sharing infor-
mation on the Internet does not comport with appropriate courtroom
conduct.120 Jurors' "insatiable appetite for immediacy [clouds their]
sense of propriety." 121 While searching on the Internet poses the most
obvious risk in terms of exposing jurors to outside information and
extraneous influence, juror use of Twitter carries with it the same po-
tential. This is because Twitter combines two dangerous features:
search capabilities and the ability to chat. Just as jurors have repeat-
edly failed to comprehend the risks associated with technology in gen-
eral, many jurors do not think that they are doing anything wrong
when they tweet.122
Perhaps this ignorance is more rational as applied to Twitter than
the Internet because Twitter feels more like a private communica-
tion.123 It is "so easy to update, that people tend to go to Twitter the
second they've got something to say; just like you would whisper fresh
gossip into your best friend's ear."124 "'People tend to forget that ...
To determine whether the outside information or extraneous information prejudiced the juror,
the "nature of the allegations" should be evaluated. Amy B. Sosin, Influences on the Jury, 86
GEo. L.J. 1638, 1643 (1998). There are several key considerations to be addressed by the judge
when jurors micro-blog about trials in which they are currently participating: "[(1)] Did the ju-
rors discuss the details of the trial? [(2)] Did the jurors display a pretrial bias for or against one
party? [(3)] Did fellow sitting jurors read the blog or electronic communication during the trial
and thus become unduly influenced?" Raysman & Brown, supra note 95.
118. See Johnson, supra note 12. A Twitter user is also cleverly called a "Twitizen." Id. at 36.
119. Some jurors do not understand that the new technology is off limits. Bruce Carton, New
Model Jury Instruction Takes Aim at Twittering Jurors, LEGAL BLOG WATCH (Feb. 9, 2010,10:21
AM), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal-blog-watchl2010/02/new-model-jury-instruction-
takes-aim-at-twittering-jurors.html. This disconnect is largely due to the fact that "'jurors may
consider constant communication through cell phones, Blackberries and other devices to be a
normal part of everyday life."' Steven C. Bennett, Texting Jurors Pose Problems for Courts,
INTERNET EVOLUTION (Feb. 16,2010), http://www.internetevolution.com/author.asp?section-id=
795&doc id=187985 (quoting a Florida Bar committee report).
120. See Edwards, supra note 19, at 2.
121. David Chartier, Juror's Twitter Posts Cited in Motion for Mistrial, ARSTECHNICA (Mar.
15, 2009, 10:15 PM), http://arstechnica.com/web/news/2009/03/jurors-twitter-posts-cited-in-mo-
tion-for-mistrial.ars.
122. See Edwards, supra note 19, at 2.
123. See Stan Schroeder, Your Honor, I Tweeted, MASHABLE (Mar. 17, 2009), http://mash-
able.com/2009/03/17/your-honor-i-tweeted/.
124. Id.
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twittering . . . is also speech.' "125 Courts have found it difficult to
tame the "subconscious distinction" jurors make between different
types of speech.126
The most publicized example illustrating this confusion occurred in
the Summer of 2009. NBC Today Show weatherman Al Roker was
called for jury duty.127 Following his summons, he sent out a stream
of tweets.128 The tweets began the night before trial and continued
while Mr. Roker was in the jury assembly room.129 When he learned
that he could not tweet, Mr. Roker's initial response was that he "was
doing nothing wrong."o30 He just kept tweeting.131 Mr. Roker later
realized the "errors of his tweeting" and publicly apologized via Twit-
ter and in-person on the Today Show.132
Instances in which jurors attempt to creatively circumvent the rules
are more serious than instances in which jurors are merely ignorant of
the rules. One juror blogged: "Hey guys! I know jurors aren't sup-
posed to talk about their trial, but nobody said they couldn't LIVE-
BLOG it, right? Am I right or am I right?!?" 133 Current jury instruc-
tions that fail to address blogging and tweeting leave room for this
sentiment.
Attorneys have begun developing strategic solutions to deal with
potential Twittering jurors. Some attorneys are using the voir dire
process to inquire about potential jurors' technology habits in an at-
tempt to determine who is likely to break the rules.134 Other attor-
neys have begun studying their jury's social networking Web sites
125. Greg Moran, Revised Jury Instructions: Do Not Use the Internet, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIB. (Sept. 13, 2009, 2:00 AM), http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2009/sep/13/revised-jury-
instructions-do-not-use-internet/ (quoting Thomas Jefferson Law Professor Julie Cromer
Young). While modern speech has "an impersonality about it . . . it is [still] a communication."
Id.
126. Id.
127. Edwards, supra note 19, at 2.
128. Jen Carlson, Roker Admits Mistake, Keeps Tweeting, GOTHAMIST (May 29, 2009), http://
gothamist.com/2009/05/29/roker.php; Dareh Gregorian, OH, WHATA TWIT!, N.Y. POST ON-
LINE (May 29, 2009, 12:15 PM), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regionallitemorPeW3RKHabF
GbsbXOYCXI.
129. Edwards, supra note 19, at 2.
130. Id.
131. See Gregorian, supra note 128.
132. See Edwards, supra note 19.
133. Renaud, supra note 64.
134. See Danzig, supra note 5, at 40-41. These attorneys also ask if the potential jurors have
already broken the rules. See id. This additional inquiry is wise in the modern age, as illustrated
by a recent South Dakota case, Russo v. Takata Corp., 774 N.W.2d 441 (S.D. 2009). A juror
performed a Google search on the defendant seat belt manufacturer in a products liability
wrongful death action after receiving his jury summons, but before voir dire. Id. The juror did
not disclose that he had completed the search during voir dire. Id. at 445. During deliberations,
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before and during trial.135 Attorneys have monitored tweets for evi-
dence of juror prejudgment, prejudice, or the formation of opinions
not based upon evidence admitted at trial. 136 While this monitoring
might detect issues when they arise, it does not prevent them. With-
out prevention, there is likely to be a substantial expenditure of judi-
cial resources. The Twitter cases in Arkansas and Pennsylvania
illustrate poor judicial economy.
C. "Twittering Juror" Case Law: The Newest Form of the
"Google Mistrial"
The Internet has been "wreaking havoc" in courtrooms since
2001.137 The variety of juror misconduct that has occurred on the In-
ternet is astounding.138 The common forms of juror online miscon-
the juror shared the content of the search with the other members of the jury. Id. at 443. As a
result, the verdict was vacated. Id. at 443-44.
135. See Texts and "Tweets" by Jurors, Lawyers Pose Courtroom Conundrums, TRIAL (Aug.
2009), http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/hs.xsl/10049.htm.
136. See generally Memorandum for Defendant's Second Motion for New Trial at 15, United
States v. Fumo, No. 06-CR-319 (E.D. Pa. July 9, 2009), available at http://www.paed.us-
courts.gov/documents/opinions/09DO800P.pdf.
137. Schwartz, supra note 21; see also Keene & Handrich, supra note 20. The phenomenon of
jurors using the Internet is not a recent one. Since confronted with Internet-accessing jurors,
courts have had occasion to comment. Judicial opinions recognize the problems posed by the
Internet as well as potential solutions. For example, in 2003, the Colorado Court of Appeals
noted,
Although the Internet has made information more accessible for the average person,
the information obtained thereby may be misleading, taken out of context, outdated, or
simply inaccurate. . . . In view of the problems and dangers associated with the un-
supervised use of the Internet, trial courts should emphasize that jurors should not
consult the Internet, or any other extraneous materials, at any time during the trial,
including during deliberations.
People v. Wadle, 77 P.3d 764, 771 (Colo. App. 2003).
138. The examples are numerous and varied. Jurors are using Internet search engines to re-
search the case on which they are currently serving. The problem is prevalent. "[A] San Fran-
cisco Superior Court judge dismissed 600 potential jurors after several acknowledged going
online to research the . . . case before them." Courts Cracking Down on Texting Jurors, Fox
NEws (Mar. 7, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/03/07/courts-cracking-texting-jurors/.
In an eight-week federal drug trial, the judge declared a mistrial after learning that eight of the
jurors were running Google searches, browsing online media coverage of the case, and consult-
ing Wikipedia. See Browning, Dangers of the Online Juror, supra note 1, at 217. In Wardlaw v.
Maryland, 971 A.2d 331 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007), the court held that a juror's investigation on
the Internet of the nature of the defendant's sexually abused daughter's mental illness consti-
tuted "egregious misconduct." A juror in United States v. Bristol-Martir, 570 F.3d 29 (1st Cir.
2009), conducted an Internet search for definitions of certain terms and for laws. Id. at 36.
Jurors are also using Facebook. Baltimore Mayor Shelia Dixon challenged her embezzlement
conviction after learning that five jurors had "friended" each other on Facebook during the trial.
See Courts Cracking Down, supra. A juror in the U.K. posted a poll on her Facebook page
asking her friends to help her decide how to vote in the child abduction case on which she was
serving. Id.
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duct occurring in America's courtrooms have been changing over
time, as new Web sites become popular for jurors.139
The prevalence of "Twittering juror" case law arose in 2009; it rep-
resents a twist on the general problem of technology in the courtroom.
The first publicized instance of a juror using Twitter was in an Arkan-
sas civil jury trial in March 2009.140 The investors of a building prod-
ucts company brought suit against the company, Stoam Holdings, and
its CEO, Russell Wright. 141 The suit alleged that the defendants were
involved in a Ponzi scheme.142 After deliberation, the jury entered a
$12 million dollar verdict against Stoam.143 The defense requested a
mistrial because of a "Twittering juror"-Jonathan Powell.144 The
court denied the motion, saying the tweets did not demonstrate that
Powell was partial to either side.145
Johnathan Powell tweeted before and during the trial.146 Before the
trial began, Powell tweeted, "Well, I finally got called for jury duty. It
is kinda exciting."147 Later he posted, "trying to learn about [j]ury
duty for tomorrow, but all searches lead me to [s]uggestions for get-
ting out of it, instead of rocking it."148 When he showed up at the
courthouse, Powell tweeted: "I guess Im [sic] early. Two Angry Men
just wont [sic] do."149
While most of the tweets contained inane details of his experience
on the jury, two of his eight tweets during trial were particularly prob-
lematic. 50 Powell tweeted about the verdict: "So Johnathan, what did
you do today? Oh nothing really, I just gave away TWELVE MIL-
Jurors have also been known to blog. A California appellate court reversed a conviction after
learning that the foreman was discussing jury deliberations on his blog. See Browning, Dangers
of the Online Juror, supra note 1, at 217.
139. Portable Technology Causing Trouble in Courtrooms, supra note 117.
140. See Chartier, supra note 121.
141. See Ark. Juror 'Tweets' During Trial, CBS 11 (Mar. 13, 2009, 10:45 AM), http://cbsll.tv.
com/watercooler/juror.uses.twitter.2.958447.html.
142. See Chartier, supra note 121.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. John G. Browning, Dangers of the Online Juror, D MAGAZINE (May 12, 2010), http://
www.dmagazine.com/Home/D-Magazine/2010/Legal-Directory_2010/Dangers of-theOnline_
Juror.aspx.
146. See Larry Greenemeier, Twitter This: Will Juror Tweeting Lead to New Trial, Sc. AM.
BLOG (Mar. 17, 2009, 7:27 PM), http://scientificamerican.com/blog/60-second-science/post.cfm?
id=twitter-this-will-juror-tweeting-le-2009-03-17.
147. Id.
148. The One Simple Rule When Jurors Go Online, DELIBERATIONS, http://jurylaw.typepad.
com/deliberations/2009/03/the-one-simple-rule.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
149. Christopher Spencer, Juror's Tweet Prompts New Trial Request, MORNING NEWS, Mar.
13, 2009, at 3A.
150. Id.
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LION DOLLARS of somebody else's money!"151 Johnathan also
wrote, thirty-four minutes later, "Oh and nobody buy Stoam. It's bad
mojo, and they'll probably cease to exist, now that their wallet is $12M
lighter. http://www.stoam.com." 152
In denying the motion for a mistrial, the court noted that Powell's
Twitter use was one-way.153 Powell posted his comments, but did not
see posts or replies from other users. 154 Therefore, Powell's tweets did
not subject the proceedings to extraneous influence, as Powell did not
read anything from outside the courtroom. 55 Had Powell read replies
from other Twitter users, the situation would have been different.
Then, there would have been outside information entering the court-
room. While Powell shared information about the trial with his Twit-
ter followers, the information he shared was not prejudicial to the
verdict.
Powell's post-trial confusion about what he had done wrong illumi-
nates the misunderstanding of the average Twitterer. A post-trial in-
terview with juror Johnathan Powell indicated that Powell was
unaware that his Twittering had the potential to negatively affect the
trial. When asked: "[w]hen you wrote [the tweets] . . . did you even
consider that any of this might happen?" Powell responded, "[n]ot at
all. I paid very close attention at the trial and followed all of [the
court's] rules . . . I was not trying to shake up the system here. I was
just doing what I do every day."156 Furthermore, Powell said "[t]he
rule was to not talk to anyone about the trial, during the trial . .. [w]e
were allowed to have our cell[ ]phones and use them during the
breaks. There was no rule against texting, or in my case,
[t]weeting."i 5 7
In July 2009, another Twittering juror case made headlines.'15 In
United States v. Fumo-a federal political corruption trial against an
ex-Pennsylvania senator-the defense counsel moved to remove juror
Eric Wuest. 159 The motion was based on Wuest's posting of trial in-
formation on both his Facebook page and Twitter feed. 160 Wuest had
151. Greenemeier, supra note 146.
152. Chartier, supra note 121.
153. Spencer, supra note 149.
154. Id.
155. See John Gambrell, Appeal Claims Juror Bias in 'Tweets' Sent During $12 Million Case,
LAW.COM (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202429071686.
156. Bartholomew, supra note 18.
157. Id.
158. Schwartz, supra note 21, at Al.
159. United States v. Fumo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 544, 547 (E.D. Pa. 2009).
160. See generally Motion of Defendant Fumo for Immediate Voir Dire of Deliberating Ju-
rors, United States v. Fumo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (No. 06-CR-319).
2010]1 199
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
"violated [the] court's admonitions by disclosing the status of deliber-
ation to his friends (and a vast number of strangers)."16 1 The court
denied the motion to remove juror Wuest and deliberations were al-
lowed to continue.162 The decision was partially based on Judge Ron-
ald Buckwalter's meeting with Wuest.163 The Judge declined to
remove the juror because he found Wuest's statement, that "no one
outside the jury had influenced him," to be credible. 164
After trial, the defendant moved for a mistrial and a new trial.165
The motion for the new trial was based on the fact that other jurors
knew Wuest was tweeting during trial.166 The court denied both mo-
tions.167 The Judge held that the defendant did not suffer prejudice
that would have mandated a new trial. 168 There was no prejudice be-
cause the juror had not read any replies to his tweets. 169 Therefore,
the juror did not access outside information and could not have been
subject to extraneous prejudicial influence. 170
Although neither case found the tweeting to have merited post-ver-
dict relief, both holdings highlight the potential for danger. Post-ver-
dict relief was unnecessary in both cases because each Twittering juror
sent tweets, but received no reply. Had the Twittering jurors received
tweets, or received comments on their tweets, as opposed to just send-
ing tweets, there would have been a greater likelihood that post-ver-
dict relief would have been necessary. This is because there would
have been access to outside information or the possibility that the ju-
ror was subject to extraneous influence. With only slightly altered fac-
tual details, litigants could have been denied justice due to the
Twittering juror. This potential for harm should not go unchecked.
161. Greenemeier, supra note 146.
162. See Rebecca Porter, Texts and "Tweets" by Jurors, Lawyers Pose Courtroom Conun-
drums, AM. AsS'N OF JUST. ONLINE (Aug. 2009), http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/xchg/justice/ns.
x1/10049.htm.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Memorandum for Defendant's Second Motion for New Trial at 15, United States v.
Fumo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 544 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (No. 06-CR-319), available at http://www.paed.us-
courts.gov/documents/opinions/09DO800P.pdf.
166. Fumo, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 544.
167. Id. at 560.
168. Id. at 558.
169. See id. at 555 (noting that "Wuest's postings ... [did not] subject[] him to any outside
influence").
170. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
This Part proposes a preventative solution to silence the Twittering
juror. In the hope of keeping technology out of the jury box, this
Comment suggests a cautionary jury instruction and recommends ad-
ditional preventative measures for judges and lawyers to employ.
Academics, judges, and practitioners alike recognize the need for re-
form; in many jurisdictions they have begun working toward a pre-
ventative solution.171 Current preventative jury instructions provide a
171. Only a handful of states have adopted pattern jury instructions thus far. See Molly DiBi-
anca, Jury Instructions re: Technology Social Media, GOING PAPERLESS BLOG (Apr. 10, 2010,
8:18 PM), http://goingpaperlessblog.com/social-media-in-the-legal-profession/. California, Con-
necticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, New York, South Carolina, and Wiscon-
sin have written prohibitions against technology use by jurors into the preliminary cautionary
jury instruction that is given to jurors before the deliberation process. Id.; see also California,
Pattern Jury Instruction (Civil) 100, available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/jury/civiljuryinstruc-
tions/documentsicaci_20091215.pdf; Connecticut, Pattern Jury Instruction (Civil) 1.1-1, available
at http://www.jud.ct.gov/JI/Civil/partl/1.1-1.htm; Florida, Pattern Qualifications Jury Instruction,
available at http://www.floridasupremecourt.org/pub-info/summaries/briefs/10/10-51/Filed_01-
14-2010_Appendix%20A.pdf; Illinois, Pattern Jury Instruction 1.01; Indiana, Pattern Preliminary
Jury Instruction, available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/orders/rule-amendments/2010/0301-
jury.pdf; Michigan, Pattern Jury Instruction 2.511, available at http://courts.michigan.gov/
supremecourt/Resources/Administrative/2008-33.pdf; New York, Pattern Preliminary Jury In-
struction 6, available at http://www.nycourts.gov/cji/1-General/CJI2d.JuryAdmonitions.pdf;
South Carolina, Pattern Social Media Jury Instruction, available at http://goingpaperlessb-
log.com/2010/02/24/more-jury-instructions-to-deal-with-social-media-in-the-courtrooml; Wiscon-
sin, Pattern Jury Instruction (Criminal) 50, available at http://www.postcrescent.comlassets/pdf/
U014968718.PDF. All the above instructions were adopted between May 2009 and July 2010.
See DiBianca, supra. The instructions represent a revolutionary effort to combat technology use
by jurors. However, many fall short of an ideal prohibitive instruction.
Several other states have only begun to confront technology use by jurors. For example, Mis-
sissippi created a commission to evaluate current jury instructions and make recommendations
for alterations based on changes in the law and technology. See State of Mississippi Judiciary,
Model Jury Instructions Commission Begins Work (2009), available at http://
www.mssc.state.ms.us/news/2009/3 -26 09_mji-commission.pdf. The commission noted "the ca-
pabilities of a juror to do [I]nternet research via a Blackberry device or talk about a case via the
social media Twitter, even while deliberating in the jury room, are raising . . . concerns." Id.
Presiding Mississippi Supreme Court Justice George C. Carlson, Jr. said, "We are going to have
to deal with [increasing use of technology by jurors], probably by way of instructions." Id.
There is a movement toward new instructions in other American states. Wisconsin, Missis-
sippi, Kansas, and Pennsylvania are also discussing new guidelines. Edwards, supra note 19, at
10. Several federal circuits confront the Twittering-juror problem with a prohibitive instruction.
See DiBianca, supra. The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management recently
issued a memorandum endorsing a suggested set of jury instructions that "judges should consider
using to help deter jurors from using electronic technologies to research or communicate about
cases on which they serve." Memorandum from the Committee on Court Administration and
Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States (Jan. 28, 2010), available at
http://www.wired.comlimages..blogs/threatlevel/2010/02/juryinstructions.pdf. The federal in-
struction is purely a recommendation and is not mandatory. See id. Several circuits have their
own instructions. The Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits are among those circuits that attempt to
keep technology out of their courtrooms by instruction. See Third Circuit, Pattern Jury Instruc-
tion 1.3, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/civiljuryinstructions/Final-Instructions/novem-
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springboard for the creation of a new jury instruction. An examina-
tion of current preventative approaches illustrates that the instruc-
tions are inadequate: the instructions (1) are not uniform;172 (2) lack
specificity;173 (3) do not provide the policy reasons behind the prohib-
ited instructions; 174 and (4) are not provided both orally and in writ-
ing.17 5 A new pattern instruction should be specific, provide reasons
for the prohibition, and be given to jurors in writing.176 A prevent-
ative solution is proposed.
A. Judicial Recognition of the Need for a
Technology-Inclusive Instruction
Courts are "grappling with how to deal with this ... new world of
instant electronic information." 77 Most judges are recognizing the
need to go beyond the current boilerplate instructions to specifically
prohibit the use of the Internet and social networking media in their
instructions.178 One judge reported that he had a "strong feeling that
jurors are turning to the Internet more and more." 179 "[J]udges
should be very concerned . . . now is the time to get real specific . . .
because this technology has become so seductive that we almost [turn
to it] mindlessly."180
"[D]igital intimacy has become the social norm" and judges see ju-
rors' tendency to use the Internet in the courtroom.181 "Today's jurors
come to the courthouse wired with laptops, PDAs and smart
phones." 182 They have a need to be constantly connected. 183 Jurors'
instinct to turn to the Internet, compounded by the amount of mate-
ber2009/1 Chaps_1_2_3_2009 November.pdf; Eighth Circuit, Pattern Jury Instruction (Civil)
1.05, available at http://www.juryinstructions.ca8.uscourts.gov/civil-manual_2008_expanded.pdf;
Ninth Circuit, Pattern Jury Instruction (Civil) 1.12, available at http://207.41.19.15/web/sdocu-
ments.nsf18d8322df5fb351c8825728200016dd0/3af4479d9540726088257289007b7d6e?Open
Document.
172. See infra notes 206-32 and accompanying text.
173. See infra notes 233-63 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 264-77 and accompanying text.
175. See infra notes 278-88 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 289-301 and accompanying text.
177. Dennis M. Sweeney, Commentary: Twitter and Tweeting During Jury Service, BALT.
REC., Apr. 20, 2009, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qn4l83/is-20090420/ai-n315
75792/.
178. Browning, Dangers of the Online Juror, supra note 1, at 219.
179. Jessica Stephen, The Move to Silence Juror Twittering, Wis. L.J. (Apr. 20, 2009), http://
www.wislawjournal.com/article.cfm/2009/04/20/The-move-to-silence-juror-Twittering.
180. Tom Murse, Rosburo Jurors' Facebook Posting Pose Problems, LANCASTER ONLINE
(Aug. 4, 2009), http://articles.1ancasteronline.com/local/4/240616.
181. Browning, Dangers of the Online Juror, supra note 1, at 220.
182. Portable Technology Causing Trouble in Courtrooms, supra note 117.
183. See Keene & Handrich, supra note 102, at 15.
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rial easily accessible online, is the foundation of the problem.18 4 The
need for a new approach is clear.
Some judges have adeptly responded to technology entering their
courtrooms. During the decades of the rise in popularity of the In-
ternet, former Illinois state Judge Warren Wolfson used an instruction
that prohibited jurors from using it.1s5 Judge Wolfson tied the prohi-
bition on Internet use to the policy reasons behind it, in the hope that
it would further encourage jurors to abide by his instruction.186 But
an instruction that simply highlights the Internet is no longer
enough. 87
There is a growing recognition of the need to incorporate into jury
instructions Web sites that are specifically prohibited. "[S]ome judges
have already started adapting their instructions to address everything
from searches on Google Earth to Twitter updates."188 Milwaukee
County Circuit Chief Judge Jeffery A. Kremers gives a jury instruction
that has been adapted to modern technologies.18 9 Judge Kremers be-
lieves that judges are increasingly instructing jurors using a technol-
ogy-inclusive instruction. 190 While these instructions are currently
being given on a court-by-court basis, the instructions prohibiting
technology use by jurors are quickly becoming the new norm across
the country. 191
184. See Jesse Fray, Judges Beefing up Jury Instructions to Avoid Improper Use of Cell Phone,
Internet, Technology, KTKA (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.ktka.com/news/2009/mar/24/judges-
beefingjury-instructions avoidimproper us/.
185. Warren Wolfson, Judges to Jurors re: Internet Instruction (on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Wolfson Instruction], received during an interview with Judge John Grogan, Circuit Court of
Cook County, in Chicago, Illinois on November 5, 2009 [hereinafter Interview with John Gro-
gan]. The instruction reads,
Some of you might know how to use a computer well enough to look things up on the
[Internet. You must resist the temptation to look up anything that might be related to
this case. Our system of law is based on the principle that a jury's decision will be
based only on the evidence and law heard and seen in the courtroom. If you were to
use an information from some outside source, like the [I]nternet, or a magazine, or
something someone says to you, you would be violating your oath as a juror. I know
you want to be fair to all parties in this case. That means you must rely only on what
you hear and see in this courtroom.
Id. Judge Wolfson was a trial judge in the 1990s and an appellate judge until recently. Interview
with Warren Wolfson, Dean, DePaul Univ. Coll. of Law, in Chi., Ill. (Oct. 19, 2009) [hereinafter
Interview with Warren Wolfson].
186. Wolfson Instruction, supra note 185.
187. Interview with Warren Wolfson, supra note 185.
188. Stephen, supra note 179 (quoting Milwaukee County Chief Judge Jeffery A. Kremers).
189. Id.
190. See id.
191. Id.
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Judges in Illinois have similarly recognized the growing need for a
cautionary jury instruction. Illinois trial Judge John Grogan uses a
jury instruction to warn his juries of the potential problems likely to
be caused by technology in the jury box. 192 Grogan uses his prelimi-
nary instruction to warn jurors of the prohibition against technology
use.193 He feels it is a necessity in the modern era.
The need for a new instruction is not a viewpoint shared by all
judges. One judge commented,
[J]udges [who] I have discussed the issue with believe that the best
they can do is to reiterate the traditional warnings from the pattern
jury instructions and leave it at that. In their view, to be more spe-
cific simply suggests ways that the jurors can access information or
violate the rule, and in any event, a more specific instruction is
bound to be under-inclusive in light of rapid technological
developments. 194
However, this view is largely rejected.195 Judges who feel there is a
need for an instruction prohibiting technology use generally argue for
detailed instructions. 1 96 This is because the risks of being more spe-
cific are drastically outweighed by the usefulness of identifying spe-
cific prohibited behavior. Because they are naturally invested in the
concept of judicial economy,197 judges ought to err on the side of cau-
tion by using a potentially under-inclusive instruction.198 Without
specificity, jurors remain confused about the distinction between ac-
ceptable and prohibited behavior.
192. Interview with John Grogan, supra note 185.
193. Id. Judge Grogan's instruction reads,
The use of cell phones, text messaging, Internet posting and Internet access devices
in connection with your duties violates the rules of evidence and you are prohibited
from using them.
You should not do any independent investigation or research on any subject relating
to the case. What you have seen or heard outside the courtroom is not evidence. This
includes . . . any information available on the Internet. Such . . . information [is] not
evidence and your verdict must not be influenced in any way by such material.
John Grogan, Preliminary Cautionary Instructions §§ 6-7 (on file with author).
194. Thaddeus Hoffmeister, Proposals to Rein in Juror Twittering and Online Research, Ju-
RIES BLOG (Apr. 21, 2009, 3:05 AM), http://juries.typepad.comjuries/2009/04/proposals-to-rein-
in-juror-twittering-and-online-research.html.
195. See Stephen, supra note 179. The Committee on Court Administration for the federal
courts wrote that a "more explicit mention" of the prohibition "would help jurors better under-
stand and adhere to the scope of the prohibition." Committee on Court Administration and
Case Management, supra note 171, at 2.
196. Interview with Warren Wolfson, supra note 185.
197. See, e.g., Jerry Palmer, Specificity in Jury Instructions, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL. 129, 129
(2000). Judges have no desire to unnecessarily retry a case. See id.
198. Interview with Warren Wolfson, supra note 185.
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As a trend, judges are beginning to instruct their juries more thor-
oughly than they have in the past.199 In addition to the general cau-
tionary warning, judges inform their juries about the most flagrant and
commonly encountered types of juror misconduct: turning to the In-
ternet for information and social networking. 200 Among these judges,
most share the viewpoint that a uniform policy to combat technology
in the jury box is a necessity.201 Work must be done to produce a
"technology-inclusive jury instruction." 2 0 2
B. Current Treatment of Juror Use of Technology in the Jury Box
Courts are attempting to prevent technology from entering the jury
box by using technology-inclusive jury instructions.203 Rules commit-
tees in a number of states have created a new jury instruction to com-
bat technology use by jurors. 204 These instructions vary in the
strength of their prohibition. While the instructions are a good start,
they generally fall short because they (1) are inconsistent, (2) are not
specific, (3) do not inform jurors of the policy reasons behind the pro-
hibition, and (4) are generally not in writing. In the words of one
commentator "[T]echnology has far outpaced the court rules."205
1. Litigants Would Be Better Served by Pattern Jury Instructions
Courts currently lack uniformity in how they prevent juror use of
technology. Some courts ban technology from the courtroom alto-
gether, some take a discretionary approach allowing judges to decide
whether it will enter the courtroom, and others have developed pat-
tern jury instructions. 206 A uniform approach, across jurisdictions and
within a jurisdiction, would better serve litigants.
Some courts have banned electronic devices altogether from their
courtrooms. 2 0 7 These courts take away cell phones, PDAs, BlackBer-
rys, iPhones, laptops, and other mobile technology when a juror enters
199. See Stephen, supra note 179.
200. Id.
201. Fray, supra note 184.
202. Stephen, supra note 179.
203. See Browning, Dangers of the Online Juror, supra note 1, at 219.
204. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
205. See Baldas, supra note 26.
206. See Porter, supra note 162; see also DiBianca, supra note 171.
207. See Porter, supra note 162; see also Vill Vidonic, Juries v. Technology: Secrecy Bubble
Bursting, BEAVER CouNTY TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009; see also Sweeney, supra note 177. Legal blog-
gers have characterized these courts as "lack[ing] ... WiFi love." John Bringardner, May Jurors
Blog Jury Duty?, LAW.COM (Oct. 3, 2005, 3:56 PM), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/le-
gal blog-watchl2005/10/may-jurors-blog.html#com.
2010] 205
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
the courtroom. 208 These courts are especially strict about keeping the
devices out of reach during the deliberation process.209 This complete
ban on technology is not the wisest approach.210
Even when technology is banned from the courtroom, there is a
problem: judges, attorneys, and litigants cannot stop jurors from using
their mobile technological devices on their own time.211 Jurors still
have access to technology during any breaks from trial and, in multi-
day trials, in between sessions. 212 While courts easily have the ability
to monitor the jurors' activities when they are in the courthouse,
courts lack the ability to monitor any activity that occurs when jurors
are on recess, on lunch break, or when they go home for an evening in
between sessions. 213 Taking away mobile technology when a juror en-
ters the courthouse does not solve the problem if the jury is not
sequestered. 214
Furthermore, taking away cell phones, smartphones, and laptops
from jurors will cause unnecessary frustration.215 Judge Sweeney
notes,
This policy ... prevents jurors-who are performing a valuable pub-
lic service-from being able easily to contact family and their work-
places during the many breaks that may occur in a lengthy trial.
Given the culture that has developed, this can be perceived as bur-
densome and unreasonable. And of course, as soon as jurors return
to their cars at lunchtime or at the end of the day, they can pick up
their smartphones and be fully connected. 216
For this reason, banning technology from the courtroom is not a com-
plete solution.217
In the majority of jurisdictions, the decision about whether to use a
technology-oriented prohibitive jury instruction is left to the discre-
tion of the individual judges.218 This discretionary approach is inade-
quate because there is no guarantee that jurors will be instructed not
208. Sweeney, supra note 177.
209. See id.
210. See id. "Economics, not to mention inconvenience and discomfort of jurors" decreases
the feasibility of the option. Artigliere et al., supra note 4, at 9.
211. See Wilson, supra note 62.
212. See id.
213. See id.
214. See Browning Part 3, supra note 1.
215. See Sweeney, supra note 177.
216. Id.
217. See id.
218. See Porter, supra note 162.
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to use technology.219 Further, a discretionary approach does not pro-
vide consistency within a jurisdiction to all litigants. 220
The wisest approach courts use to confront juror use of technology
is a pattern jury instruction.221 Pattern instructions result in the most
consistency for litigants. 222 Only a handful of states have developed
pattern jury instructions regarding juror use of technology. 223 Com-
mittees draft pattern jury instructions.224 These committees are com-
posed of judges, trial lawyers, and law professors who, due to their
experience with jurors, can anticipate comprehension problems better
than the average lawyer.225 During the past few decades, 226 pattern
instructions have been based on juror comprehension and plain-En-
glish principles.227 Studies of juror deliberations have shown that pat-
tern instructions can increase juror comprehension. 228  More
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. Pattern instructions are also termed "standard," "approved," or "uniform" instructions.
Model Jury Instructions: A 'Basic Practice' Guide, MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?2130&pagelD=1869 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). A pat-
tern instruction is "[a] form jury charge usually approved by a state bar association or similar
group regarding matters arising in a typical case." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 875 (8th ed.
2004). "Courts usually accept model jury instructions as authoritative." Id. Pattern instructions
are used in both state and federal courts, for both civil and criminal trials. See MARQUETTE
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAw, supra.
222. E.g., Interview with Warren Wolfson, supra note 185. This is because jury instructions
must "communicate the law to jurors." Peter M. Tiersma, Communicating with Juries: How to
Draft More Understandable Instructions, 10 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 1, 1 (2005).
223. See infra note 173 and accompanying text. This figure is notably small, as forty-eight
states use basic pattern jury instructions to provide a framework for the charge to the jury. Jury
Instructions, THE LAw OFFICES OF MILLER & Zois, L.L.C., http://www.millerandzois.com/
jury-instructions.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
224. See Ellen Chilton & Patricia Henley, Improving the Jury System, PuB. L. RESEARCH
INST. (1996), http://w3.uchastings.edulpirilspr96tex/juryinst.html.
225. See id.
226. Id. at 3. Jury instructions might never be clear to all jurors, but they should be clear to
the average juror. Tiersma, supra note 224, at 3. Instructions that communicate the law to the
average juror allow courts to assume that "in most cases the majority of jurors will correctly
understand the law." Id. at 3.
227. A plain-English jury instruction advocates everyday language rather than more complex
legalese. See Frequently Asked Questions, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.
ncsconline.org/Juries/InnPlainEnglishFAQ.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). These instructions
"make an effort to be clear, concise, and effect[ive] in conveying complicated legal ideas in
normal English." Id.
228. See generally Amiram Elwork, Bruce D. Sales & James J. Alfini, Juridic Decisions: In
Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 163 (1977). Jurors often reach
improper verdicts when they misunderstand a judge's instructions. See id. at 164. Elwork, Sales,
and Alfini's experiments simulated a civil trial, giving three separate juries different instructions.
See id. at abstract In the experiment, one jury received the current Michigan pattern instruc-
tions, another received rewritten Michigan pattern jury instructions, and the last jury received no
set of instructions at all. See id. When identical videotaped trials were shown to the mock juries,
the jury receiving the rewritten pattern instructions in plain English found the correct verdict.
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comprehensibly written instructions illuminate to jurors the impor-
tance of their role in the trial process. 22 9 Jurors who recognize that
their service is significant will be more likely to put in the time and
effort necessary to reach a correct verdict. 230 The use of incompre-
hensible instructions "sends a message to jurors that the law is an un-
explainable mystery and that juror understanding of the law is not
important." 231 When jurors understand an instruction, they are likely
to apply it correctly.232
2. Jury Instructions Should Be Detailed Because a Lack of
Specificity Leaves Room for Juror Confusion
Current pattern jury instructions are problematic because they lack
specificity. Most instructions give absolutely no direction to jurors
concerning technology. 233 Others only vaguely prohibit using the In-
ternet.234 These two types of unspecific instructions both result in
confusion for jurors.235 Without specificity, instructions are unable to
fulfill the goal of promoting juror self-restraint. 236
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's model
preliminary jury instruction similarly lacks specificity. The instruction
cautions jurors against "do[ing] any independent research or investi-
gation on your own on matters relating to the case or this type of
case." 237 The instruction tells jurors not to use the Internet for re-
Id. The juries receiving the old pattern instructions and the jury receiving no instructions at all
performed substantially worse than the jury with the new instructions. See id.
229. See, e.g., Chilton & Henley, supra note 224, at 14-15.
230. See id.
231. Id.
232. See id. at 11-12.
233. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Pattern Preliminary Jury Instructions, available at
http://www.abanet.org/labor/lel-trialad/09/Jury-Instructions.pdf. This instruction, exemplary of
those that do not prohibit Internet use, instructs jurors,
Your verdict must be based only on the evidence presented during the trial and the law.
You must not conduct any investigation on your own. Accordingly, you must not visit
any of the places described in the evidence and you must not read or listen to any
reports about the case. Further, you must not discuss this case with any person and you
must not speak with the attorneys, the witnesses, or the parties about any subject until
your deliberations are finished.
Id. The instruction does not even mention the Internet. See id. The current Seventh Circuit
instructions similarly do not mention the Internet. See Seventh Circuit, Pattern Jury Instruction
(Civil) 2.01, available at http:/Iwww.ca7.uscourts.govPatternJury-Instr/7th civ instruc -2009.pdf
(instruction before recess). Neither do the Fifth Circuit's instructions. See Fifth Circuit, Pattern
Instructions (Civil) 1.1, available at http://www.lb5.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions/2006CIVIL.pdf.
234. See infra note 171, detailing the Florida instruction.
235. See, e.g., Bartholomew, supra note 18.
236. See id.
237. Third Circuit, Pattern Jury Instruction 1.3, available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/
civiljuryinstructions/Final-Instructions/november2009/1_Chaps_1_2_3_2009_November.pdf.
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search purposes.238 But the instruction does not highlight any of the
particularly problematic services available on the Internet-such as
Twitter.239 Thus, while the instruction contextualizes the Internet in
the larger scheme of prohibited material, it does not sufficiently ad-
dress the new problems posed by technology. 240
Other courts are making progress toward the adoption of a more
detailed jury instruction. Michigan has created a new jury instruction
addressing technology in the courtroom. 241 The instruction went into
effect on September 1, 2009.242 It was the first jury instruction prohib-
iting juror use of technology to be adopted statewide.243 The court
instructs jurors that until their jury service is concluded, "they shall
not .. . use a computer, cellular phone, or other electronic device with
communication capabilities while in attendance at trial or during de-
liberation . . . or to obtain or disclose information about a case when
they are not in court." 244 The instruction is to be given after the jury
is empanelled. 245
Although the Michigan instruction highlights different forms of
technology that jurors are prohibited from using-for example, "com-
puter[s] and cellular phone[s]" 2 4 6 -it does not specify what jurors are
prohibited from actually doing with those technologies. The instruc-
tion does not enumerate what Web sites a juror is prohibited from
using to research or discuss the case on which they are serving. With-
out such enumeration, jurors are likely to be confused. Listing pro-
hibited Web sites would provide context to the extent of the
prohibition.
Illinois' new instruction is quite similar to Michigan's. Illinois Civil
Preliminary Cautionary Jury Instruction 1.01 embodies the state
rule.24 7 The Illinois Pattern Jury Instruction Committee recently mod-
ified the old instruction to include a new prohibition against technol-
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. See MICH. CT. R. 2.511(H)(2)(c)-(d).
242. Id.
243. See DiBianca, supra note 171.
244. MICH. CT. R. 2.511(H)(2)(c)-(d). "Information includes ... information about a party,
witness, attorney, or court officer; news accounts of the case; information collected through juror
research." Id.
245. See id.
246. Id.
247. Illinois, Pattern Jury Instruction 1.01.
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ogy use by jurors.2 4 8 The instruction prohibits the use of cell phones,
text messaging, Internet postings, and Internet access devices by ju-
rors in connection with their service. 249 It forbids jurors from con-
ducting independent investigation, including browsing any
"information available on the Internet." 250 Yet the instruction is not
specific enough. Like the Michigan instruction, it mentions forms of
technology that jurors are not permitted to use. However, it does not
sufficiently detail what jurors are prohibited from doing with those
technologies. Without such details the instruction is not likely to be
sufficiently effective.
In Multnomah County, Oregon, courts use a more specific instruc-
tion251 that prohibits Internet use and social networking. 252 The in-
struction is much closer to an ideal one. It lays out which activities
jurors are prohibited from engaging in during jury service: "no email-
ing, text messaging, tweeting, blogging, or any other form of commu-
nication." 253 The language is very clear and "down-to-earth," making
it easy for jurors to understand. 254 This effectively alerts jurors to
what they are not allowed to do.
The newly issued Proposed Model Jury Instructions for the federal
courts-the so-called "Twitter instructions" 255-are appropriately spe-
cific. 256 The proposed instruction is a set of two instructions: one to be
given before trial and one at the close of the case, before delibera-
tions.257 The two vary in the specificity of the prohibition. The in-
structions were developed to "address the increasing incidence of
juror use of such devices as cellular telephones or computers to con-
248. See New Jury Instructions Address Technology Concerns, PASSEN LAw GROuP BLOG
(Nov. 2, 2009, 7:20 AM), http://www.passenlaw.com/blog/personal-injury-law/jury-instructions-
address-technology-concerns.
249. Illinois, Pattern Jury Instruction 1.01. The Illinois instruction can be given either before
opening statements, or with other jury instructions that are given by the judge to the jury at the
close of the case, or both. Id. (see Notes on Use).
250. Id.
251. See Anita Ramasastry, Why Courts Need to Ban Jurors' Electronic Communications De-
vices, FINDLAw (Aug. 11, 2009), http://writ.news.findlaw.com/ramasastry/20090811.html; see also
Marcia Oddi, Managing the Electronic Communication Revolution in the Indiana Courtroom,
THE INDIANA LAw BLOG (Aug. 15, 2009, 11:29 AM), http://indianalawblog.com/archives/2009/
08/ind courts cont_5.html.
252. See Oddi, supra note 251.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Courts Cracking Down on Texting Jurors, supra note 138.
256. See Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, supra note 171, at At-
tachment. While almost ideal in terms of specificity, the instruction lacks other necessary ele-
ments, such as outlining policy considerations. See id.
257. See id. The instruction to be given before trial is more detailed and more specific than
the instruction to be given at the close of the case. See id.
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duct research on the Internet or communicate with others about
cases." 258
The instruction to be given before trial warns jurors not to "search
the [I]nternet, [W]eb[ ]sites, blogs, or use any other electronic tools to
obtain information about this case or to help you decide the case." 259
The instruction also tells jurors that they
may not communicate with anyone about the case on [their] cell
phone, through e-mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, or on
Twitter, through any blog or [W]eb[ ]site, through any [I]nternet
chat room, or by way of any other social networking websites, in-
cluding Facebook, My Space, Linkedln, and YouTube.260
By listing the names of commonly used social media Web sites, the
explanation of the prohibition against communication is specific. 26 1
But the instruction fails to list Web sites commonly used for research.
The instruction could be improved by listing common Web sites used
for research.
The proposed federal instruction to be given at the close of the case
is not as specific as the instruction to be given before trial. Like the
instruction to be given before trial, the instruction to be given at the
close of the case specifically mentions the Web sites jurors are prohib-
ited from using to communicate about the case. 2 6 2 However, the in-
struction is again not specific enough in terms of forbidding online
research.
In states where there is no standard instruction prohibiting technol-
ogy use, some attorneys and judges have taken matters into their own
hands. Even before the increase in specificity of pattern instructions
became a trend, instructions created by individual attorneys and
judges tended to be more specific than the pattern instructions
adopted by states.263 The move towards increased detail is a positive
one.
258. See Courts Cracking Down on Texting Jurors, supra note 138.
259. See Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, supra note 173, at
Attachment.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See id. The language is the same as the instruction to be given before trial. See id.
263. A judge in Arkansas gave a "high tech" instruction in his April 21, 2009 trial. Sharon
Nelson, Web 2.0 Jury Instructions in Arkansas, RIDE THE LIGHTNING BLOG (May 8, 2009, 7:00
AM), http://ridethelightning.seseient.com/2009/05/web-20-jury-instructions-in-arkansas.html.
The instruction was extremely detailed. He instructed jurors to "not use any electronic device or
media, such as the telephone, a cell or smart phone, Blackberry, PDA, computer, the Internet,
any Internet service, any text or instant messaging service, any Internet chat room, blog, or
website such as Facebook, MySpace, YouTube, or Twitter to communicate to anyone any infor-
mation about this case" or conduct any research until the judge accepted the verdict. Id. The
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3. Jurors Are More Likely to Abide by Instructions that Provide
Insight into the Policy Reasons Behind the Prohibitions
An ideal jury instruction would provide jurors with a clear and per-
suasive explanation of the policy reasons behind the prohibition. Re-
search shows that jurors are more likely to abide by an instruction that
is tied to policy concerns. 264 This is likely because policy reasons con-
textualize the prohibition for the juror, giving the instruction an in-
creased importance. Further, psychological studies have consistently
shown that judicial admonitions given without proper reasoning cre-
ate hostility on the part of jurors.265 "[W]hen [a] juror's freedom to
act is taken away by the court [without explaining the proper reason-
ing], those jurors tend to rebel and engage in the prohibited behavior
more than [they would have] had they not been warned in the first
place."266 Jury consultants recommend that policy content be care-
fully chosen and respectfully explained to jurors.267
The previously discussed Oregon instruction 268 could be redrafted
to better emphasize the policy behind the prohibition. The mere
statement, "[y]ou must resist that temptation for our system of justice
"web 2.0 jury instruction" nicely highlights all of the prohibited technologies and what jurors are
prohibited from doing on those technologies. Id.
Judge Dennis Sweeney, a retired judge from Maryland, who chairs the state's Judiciary Com-
mittee on Jury Use and Management, has suggested a specific instruction. See Dennis M. Swee-
ney, Commentary: Judge on the Jury: Jurors Online, DAILY REc. (June 1, 2009), http://
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qn4183/is20090601/ai_31935039/. The judge developed his instruc-
tion after taking suggestions from other trial judges. Id. His instruction states,
During the trial, you may not communicate with others about the trial or discuss it
with family, friends, or anyone else. This includes on-line discussions, chat rooms, or
postings on Internet sites such as Facebook, MySpace, Twitter or similar means of
communication.
You may not do any personal research of your own about the case, the attorneys, the
parties or the issues in the case. This includes Internet research of any type whether on a
cell phone, smartphone or laptop or other device as well as consulting books, newspa-
pers and magazines.
Id. (emphasis added). The instruction could be improved merely by clarifying that the listed
Web sites are not an exhaustive list.
These two instructions were extremely specific compared to other pattern instructions given at
the time. The instructions compare to the revised pattern instructions incorporating the prohibi-
tion against juror use of technology. Perhaps the individual instructions served as an impetus for
the revision of pattern instructions.
264. See Edward Schwartz, Remedy for the Googling Juror? Just Ask!, JURY Box (Mar. 18,
2009, 11:20 AM), http://juryboxblog.blogspot.com/2009/03/remedy-for-googling-juror-just-
ask.html; see also Paula Hannaford-Agor, Jury News: Google Mistrials Twittering Jurors, Juror
Blogs, and Other Technological Hazards, 24 CT. MANAGER 42, 43 (2009), available at www.
ncsconline.org/d-Research/cjs/JuryNews2009Vol24No2.pdf.
265. See id.
266. Id.
267. See id.
268. See supra notes 251-54 and accompanying text.
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to work as it should," 269 is not enough. To constitute a more effective
preventative measure, the instruction should provide a clear explana-
tion of why the use of technology by jurors is prohibited.270 Without
such reasoning, jurors are less likely to abide by the instruction.271
The court should explain to jurors that the reason that they are only
permitted to use information presented by the parties is because oth-
erwise it will create an unfair trial.
Similarly, Illinois' new instruction should further describe the policy
reasons for a prohibitive instruction.272 The instruction currently an-
nounces that jurors are prohibited from accessing the Internet because
doing so "violates the rules of evidence." 273 While a reference to the
rules of evidence nicely contextualizes the prohibition for lawyers, ju-
rors do not necessarily understand what the rules of evidence are.
The instruction should instead explain the reason for the ban in plain
English. Interestingly, the instruction's official comments do just that.
"The use of Web search engines, wireless handheld devices, and In-
ternet-connected multimedia smartphones by jurors ... has the poten-
tial to cause a mistrial . . . [and] it is critical to the administration of
justice that these electronic devices not play any role in the decision-
making process of jurors." 274 The comment nicely details the connec-
tion between the prohibition against technology and the underlying
policy. The Illinois Committee should consider using the language
from the commentary in the instruction.
Comments made during the drafting process in Wisconsin recognize
the need to connect the prohibitive instruction to policy. 275 Judge
Kremers reports, "'We're working on drafting an instruction that
would incorporate [twittering] . . . and warn jurors not only not to do
it, but also give some information on why they shouldn't do it.' "276
The policy reasons would help jurors to navigate the so-called gray
areas of when technology can compromise a case and when it can be
used merely as a tool in everyday life.277
269. Oddi, supra note 251.
270. See, e.g., Interview with Warren Wolfson, supra note 185.
271. See id.
272. See Illinois, Pattern Jury Instruction 1.01 §§ (6)-(7).
273. Id.
274. Id. § (6) cmt.
275. "State officials are drafting an instruction aimed at keeping the World Wide Web out of
the jury box." Stephen, supra note 179. Despite the fact that no incidents have yet occurred in
any proceedings in Wisconsin, the court has recognized the prevalence of the issue, the havoc
Twittering is causing in other parts of the country, and the "growing use of text messaging and
social networking" by jurors. Id.
276. Id. (quoting Judge Kremers).
277. Id.
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4. Jury Instructions Should Be Provided both Orally and in Written
Form to Emphasize the Importance of the Prohibition
The majority of the current technology-prohibitive jury instructions
are given orally.27 8 Oral instructions, without a complementary writ-
ten instruction, are not ideal. 279 Jury instructions banning technology
use need to be in writing in order to emphasize the importance of the
prohibition. 280 A certain level of formality can remind participants
that a trial is a serious event and will preserve respect for the judicial
system. 281
A written instruction must be carefully drafted. The instruction
should not use incomprehensible language that is hard to follow. 2 8 2
Legalistic language should also be avoided and everyday language
should be used. 2 8 3 Research shows that most jurors do not understand
the instructions presented to them,284 So the simpler the instructions,
the better.
Exemplifying the growing trend of issuing prohibitive instructions
in writing is a proposed jury instruction in San Francisco County.285
One of the proposed changes requires that a cover letter be attached
to juror venire questionnaires warning jurors against using the In-
ternet or social networking devices to research the case or share infor-
mation.286 A draft of the civil questionnaire cover sheet currently
reads in part, "You may not do research about any issues involved in
the case. You may not blog, Tweet, or use the Internet to obtain or
share information." 287 Judges believe that putting the social network-
278. See, e.g., Interview with Warren Wolfson, supra note 185.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. Tiersma, supra note 222, at 4.
282. JONAKAIT, supra note 77, at 206.
283. Id. at 207.
284. Id.
285. The rule was scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 2010. See Eric Sinrod, Jurors:
Keep Your E-Fingers to Yourselves, TECHNOLOGIST BLOG (Sept. 15, 2009, 9:29 AM), http://
blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2009/09/jurors-keep-your-e-fingers-to-yourselves.html. The rule
is not yet in effect. See id.
286. Kate Moser, Court Lays Down Law on Jury Internet Use, LAW.COM (Sept. 9, 2009), http:/
/www.law.com/newsire/cache/1202433656715.html. Although the county has yet to experience a
problem with jurors blogging and tweeting, court officials in the area noted that "there's a lot of
buzz in the national jury press about how to handle jurors' use of social networking Web sites."
Id.
287. Id. The proposed rule was largely adopted because the San Francisco Superior Court
had to excuse an entire panel of 600 jurors after several jurors admitted conducting Internet
research about the case. Sinrod, supra note 285. During interviews, the jurors indicated "confu-
sion about whether the admonition that had been given about not conducting outside research
applied to the Internet." Id.
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ing instruction on the civil questionnaire will provide more consis-
tency to their court system.288
C. Silencing the Twittering Juror: A Jury Instruction Proposed
The Twittering juror could be silenced with a proper jury instruc-
tion.289 The jury instruction proposed here is a realistic, preventative
solution to the problems that modern technology poses. An ideal in-
struction would (1) be implemented jurisdiction wide, (2) be specific,
(3) tie the prohibition to the policy behind the instruction, and (4) be
given orally and in writing. The instruction would read as follows:
The American court system requires that jurors decide the outcome
of a case using only the information presented to them in court by
the parties and their attorneys. This is because the parties do not
have the opportunity to test evidence from outside the courtroom.
Therefore, our rules of evidence require jurors to remain unexposed
to external information or influence. Until the judge has entered
the verdict, external research and communication with outsiders is
prohibited.
This means you may not discuss the issues posed by the case, the
parties, the parties' attorneys, the judge, or your personal experi-
ence on jury service with anyone outside of the deliberation process.
You may not share any information with, or receive any information
from, any source outside the courtroom.
It is imperative that you understand that the prohibition against re-
search and communication applies to the Internet and other elec-
tronic mediums. For example, you cannot Google anything about
the trial. You cannot Wikipedia definitions or concepts that are ap-
plicable to the case. You cannot blog or tweet about anything relat-
ing to the case or your jury service. You may not use any social
networking service, including, but not limited to, Twitter, Facebook,
MySpace, and YouTube, to send or receive messages about the trial.
This court prohibits you from conducting any online research or en-
gaging in any communication with outsiders during trial about the
case.
288. See Sinrod, supra note 285. One commentator notes,
[It] makes abundant sense for judges to be very clear in admonishing jurors that not
only are they to refrain from trying to learn about a case from traditional outside
sources, they also must be told specifically not [to] seek case information from any
electronic source, and examples of such prohibited sources should be enumerated.
Id.
289. Some judges think that an effective jury instruction can prevent potential contamination
problems posed by Twittering jurors. See, e.g., Interview with Warren Wolfson, supra note 185.
However, Douglass L. Keene, President of the American Society of Trial Consultants, has said
that "[i]t's really impossible to control" jurors seeking information outside the courtroom.
Ashby Jones, Twelve Twittering Men?, WSJ LAW BLOG (Mar. 18, 2009, 8:59 AM), http://
blogs.wsj.com/law/2009/03/18/twelve-twittering-men/.
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If you are unclear about the behavior prohibited by this instruction,
please consult with the judge. You should consult the judge before
you engage in the questionable behavior. You must always err on
the side of caution. If you feel that you cannot abide by this prohi-
bition, tell the judge immediately.
Failure to abide by this instruction will disrupt the integrity of trial
for the parties. It will result in an unfair trial, because the informa-
tion that you view or share online has not been tested in this court
of law. Juror use of technology threatens the nature of our adver-
sary system. Juror use of technology could force this court to retry
the case, wasting valuable time and resources.
Use of outside information will be considered a violation of your
oath to this court. Failure to adhere to these instructions could re-
sult in you being held in contempt of court.
The instruction should be issued in all courts within a jurisdiction to
provide consistency. It would provide all litigants in a jurisdiction
with the same likelihood that jurors will not look to extraneous
information.
The instruction rightfully places the onus on the judge to explain to
jurors why it is crucial that they not use technology to communicate
about or research the trial during their jury service. 290 The instruction
is sufficiently specific. It clarifies which technologies the jury is pro-
hibited from using. It further alerts jurors to prohibited conduct. By
mentioning specific problematic services-for example, Twitter,
Facebook, Google, and YouTube-the instruction details for jurors
what conduct is prohibited. 291 This will allow jurors to adjust their
behavior accordingly. 292
The proposed instruction also ties the prohibition against technol-
ogy use to the policy reasons behind the prohibition. The instruction
explains its two basic goals: protecting the right to a fair trial and pro-
moting judicial economy.293 The incorporation of policy helps jurors
understand why doing outside research or having outside contact is
unfair to the trial process. 294 This will encourage jurors to refrain
from using technology as prohibited.
To reemphasize, the proposed instruction should be issued both
orally and in writing. The oral instruction should be read to the jurors
at the beginning of trial, at each recess and lunch break, and at the
290. See Jones, supra note 289. However, "[it's up to Juror 11 to make sure Juror 12 stays in
line." Id. This self-policing is important to ensure that extraneous influence does not enter the
courtroom. See id.
291. See Browning, Part 3, supra note 1, at 219-20.
292. See id.
293. See, e.g., Illinois, Pattern Jury Instruction 1.01 §§ (6)-(7).
294. See Stephen, supra note 179.
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end of the session each day.2 95 It should be delivered in a manner that
emphasizes the importance of adhering to the instruction.296 "Good
communication with jurors is more than [just] words: it is timing, de-
livery, and creating the best climate for juror acceptance of the mes-
sage." 297 In addition to reading the instruction to jurors, the
instruction should be provided to the jurors in writing. 298 Writing re-
inforces the seriousness of the endeavor.299 An instruction must be
repeated often to remind the members of the jury how they should
conduct themselves.300
Use of a preventative cautionary instruction will help to tame juror
misconduct on the Internet. A clear, comprehensive instruction will
help jurors to avoid accidental misconduct and deter intentional mis-
conduct.301 Judges and lawyers should also use additional prevent-
ative measures.
D. Keeping Technology Out of the Jury Box: Additional
Preventative Measures
In addition to using a technology-inclusive cautionary jury instruc-
tion, courts should employ other preventative measures to keep tech-
nology out of the jury box. Numerous scholars and practitioners have
suggested preventative means, such as notice in the jury summons,
attorney investigation of potential jurors, voir dire examination, and
juror certifications. 302 Given the high stakes of a mistrial, judges and
lawyers should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the Internet
does not enter the jury box. 3 03
In some jurisdictions, court administrators prospectively advise ju-
rors of the prohibition on technology use. 304 Some courts have recom-
mended that the juror summons highlight the prohibition against juror
Internet research and social networking during trial.305 This warning
is apt to prevent juror exposure to extraneous information and influ-
295. See Jana Lauren Harris, Social Media in the Jury Room Can Sabotage Trials, FINDLAW
KNOWLEDGEBASE (July 21, 2009), http://knowledgebase.findlaw.com/kb/2009/Jul/32426.html.
296. E.g., Interview with Warren Wolfson, supra note 185.
297. Artigliere et al., supra note 4, at 12.
298. See Interview with Warren Wolfson, supra note 185.
299. See id.
300. See id.
301. See Artigliere et al., supra note 4, at 10-12.
302. See infra notes 308-23 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., Ron Spears, Looking for "Facts" in All the Wrong Places, 98 ILL. B.J., Feb. 2010,
at 102, 102. What steps are reasonable in any given trial may vary depending on the length, the
complexity, and the stakes of a case. See id.
304. See id.
305. See id.
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ences, as it would warn jurors up front about what technology is "off-
limits." 306
Courts are also adding statements about the prohibition against
technology use into the statements given to the general juror pool
before the beginning of voir dire.307 The instructions tell jurors not to
research or talk about cases that are taking place in the courthouse.308
Lawyers and judges are also wisely altering voir dire questioning to
include questions about whether any prospective jurors have already
conducted any prohibited research or networking online.309 Attor-
neys also access prospective jurors' social media Web sites to deter-
mine the likelihood that the juror will engage in prohibited conduct
and to determine whether each juror has already done so. 3 1 0 In fact,
trial consultants have already developed methods of searching Web
sites and creating useful data for attorneys.311
During trial, judges and lawyers should use the cautionary instruc-
tion. Repetition of the instruction is warranted.312 Also, judges
should consider asking the jurors each day if they have been abiding
by the prohibition against technology use.313 The judge could simply
greet jurors by asking them if they have been able to follow his in-
structions, including refraining from discussing the case or doing
outside research.314 Post-trial, during deliberations, courts could con-
sider barring computers and phones from the jury room.3 15 But taking
phones and computers from jurors should only be done in rare
instances. 316
The court should also require jurors to sign a declaration attesting
that each juror did not use a personal electronic device to research or
306. Carton, supra note 119.
307. See, e.g., Eric P. Robinson, Michigan High Court Sends Message to Twitterers, CITIZEN
MEDIA L. PROJEcr (Feb. 12, 2009, 4:32 PM), http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2009/michigan-
high-court-sends-message-tweeters.
308. See id.
309. See Spears, supra note 303, at 102. In order to conduct a meaningful examination, law-
yers and judges will need to be familiar with the language and terminology associated with the
social media Web sites. See Greene & Spaeth, supra note 33, at 44.
310. See Ann T. Greeley, Understanding Jury Psychology Through Research: A Powerful
Technique for Your Trial Preparation Arsenal, 39 A.B.A. BRIEF, Spring 2010, at 48, 50.
311. See id.
312. See Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, supra note 171, at At-
tachment (recommending an instruction before trial and at the close of the case).
313. See Spears, supra note 303, at 102-03.
314. See Artigliere et al., supra note 4, at 14.
315. See Spears, supra note 303, at 103.
316. See supra notes 207-17 and accompanying text.
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communicate about the trial.317 In their declaration, jurors should at-
test that they did not research the case on the Internet, communicate
through a social networking forum about the case, or use any other
electronic forum to gain access to outside information. 318 The decla-
ration should be signed at the beginning and end of each case.319
Although it is inevitable that a rogue juror will disrupt trial occa-
sionally through the use of technology, a combination of preventative
mechanisms is likely to lessen accidental technological "misadven-
tures" by jurors. 320 Use of a cautionary prohibitive instruction along
with these other preventative techniques will help courts to tame juror
misuse of technology. It is the duty of the courts to keep technology
out of the jury box.
IV. IMPACT
Courts must tame Internet-centered juror misconduct. Preventative
measures have the potential to positively impact American courts. Ju-
rors, judges, and the adversary system are all likely to benefit from the
use of a pattern jury instruction incorporating a prohibition against
technology use in combination with other preventative measures. Up-
dating preventative techniques is essential to modernize courts.
A more specific instruction could facilitate juror comprehension
and prevent juror misconduct. 321 A detailed instruction would reduce
juror confusion by clarifying what conduct is (and what is not) al-
lowed.322 Jurors could better fulfill their roles as fact-finders by basing
their decisions upon the controlled set of facts presented in court
within the articulated legal standard.323 The instruction would pre-
vent jurors from committing unintentional misconduct.324 With a spe-
317. See Michael Fertik, Jury Instructions: No Facebook, No Twitter, No Internet!, REPUTA-
TION DEFENDER BLOG (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.reputationdefenderblog.com/2009/09/17/jury-
instructions-no-facebook-no-twitter-no-internet/. The approach is especially important for
highly publicized cases or cases that have gathered media attention.
318. See Courtney L. Davenport, Radio Station to Blame for Woman's Death During Water-
Drinking Contest, TRIAL, Mar. 2010, at 55, 55 (detailing the approach used in the Jennifer
Strange water-intoxication case).
319. See id.
320. Jonsson, supra note 45.
321. See Stephen, supra note 179.
322. Id. Recent juror behavior analysis has concluded that it is important to tell jurors what
to do and what not to do. See JURY: BEHAVIORAL ASPEcrs-REACTIONS TO THE LAW, INCLUD-
ING NULLIFICATION, http://law.jrank.org/pages/1424/Jury-Behavioral-Aspects-Relations-law-in-
cluding-nullification.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). This helps to facilitate comprehension. See
id. Failing to address erroneous beliefs or questions does not make issues go away. See id.
323. See Edwards, supra note 19, at 2.
324. SUMMARIES OF SUCCESSFUL JURY MISCONDUCT CASES THROUGH SEPTEMBER 2004,
http://www.capdefnet.org/hat/contents/constitutional-issues/jury-misconduct/
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cific instruction, courts could dissuade the rogue juror from
technological misadventures. 325
Judges would also benefit from pattern instructions prohibiting ju-
ror use of technology. Judges prefer to use pattern instructions be-
cause they pose less risk to the judge of being reversed on appeal.326
Using language that has already been approved by the courts would
allow judges to feel confident in their charge to the jury.3 2 7 This confi-
dence would prove especially helpful due to constantly changing tech-
nology; a pattern instruction would list the prohibited technologies for
the judge, giving him confidence that he is not forgetting an important
one.
The proposed instruction would positively affect the adversary sys-
tem.328 The integrity of verdicts would be improved. 329 The instruc-
tion would encourage jurors to use only the information presented in
the courtroom when deliberating.330 Litigants would be afforded a
fair trial because extraneous information would be excluded. 331
A new instruction would promote judicial economy because there
would likely be fewer tainted deliberations necessitating new trials. 332
Judges should charge the jury with an instruction that appropriately
balances the expenditure of time against the dangers of prejudice.
Through a clear instruction prohibiting technology use by jurors,
judges could use judicial resources more efficiently.3 3 3 To preserve
the adversary system, a detailed instruction is a far superior solution.
Courts must respond to the presence of technology in their court-
rooms. They must adapt to the twenty-first century juror. Developing
an instruction to "[keep] the modern juror . . . insulated from the on-
jury-misconduct.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). While juror misconduct as a result of inten-
tional disobedience is always a possibility, the new instruction will eliminate misconduct by those
jurors who are simply uninformed. Id.
325. See Glenna Herald, Twitterpated, CINCINNATI B. Ass'N REP., Oct. 2009, at 18, 19.
326. See Chilton & Henley, supra note 224, at 14 ("[J]udges are talking to the appellate judges
and not the jury when giving the [jury] instructions.").
327. See id.
328. While the adversary system would likely benefit from an instruction prohibiting juror use
of technology, some will likely resist adopting pattern instructions. See, e.g., id. Some judges
and lawyers simply do not believe there is the need for a new instruction. See id Also, lawyers
are concerned with preparing jury instructions that will benefit their clients. See id. There may
be cases in which a lawyer believes that the possibility of extraneous information entering trial
could be to his client's benefit. See id.
329. See id.
330. See generally LANDSMAN, supra note 78.
331. See generally id.
332. See Stephen, supra note 179.
333. See id.
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slaught of potentially prejudicial communications-will be an ongoing
challenge for the judiciary and the bar." 334
V. CONCLUSION
Courts must constantly adapt to the modern world and the modern
juror. They must do so to continually protect litigants' rights to a fair
trial, free from extraneous influence. In keeping with the American
adversary system's prohibition on extraneous influence entering the
deliberation process,335 courts must alter preventative mechanisms to
keep the Twittering juror out of the courtroom. Prevention is the ap-
propriate measure.
Technology in the jury box has become increasingly problematic.
With the rise in popularity of mobile Internet devices, twenty-first
century jurors are likely to arrive at the courthouse accompanied by
one.336 Courts must combat what has become an instinctual habit of
online research and networking.337 New Web sites, such as Twitter,
have made online social networking dangerously similar to an in-per-
son conversation. 33 8
In 2009, Twitter became the new "hot topic" in civil procedure and
evidence law, as practitioners and academics struggled to adapt tradi-
tional rules to modern problems. 339 Two poignant cases illustrated
Twitter's potential for harm.340 These cases alerted courts across the
country to the general problems caused by technology and the specific
harms posed by Twitter. 341 Several states responded by beginning the
drafting process for a new jury instruction, warning jurors not to use
their mobile devices during trial to either research or discuss the
case.342 These current instructions are insufficient. 343
Precautionary jury instructions must prohibit juror use of technol-
ogy during trial. Courts need to instruct the jury accordingly in order
to prevent unknowing misconduct. The prohibitive instruction should
enumerate specific prohibited technologies, including Twitter.344 It
334. Jonsson, supra note 45 (quoting Judge Dennis M. Sweeney).
335. See, e.g., LANDSMAN, supra note 78, at 1.
336. See supra notes 61-76 and accompanying text.
337. See Hoenig, supra note 25. The "dazzling blitz of electronic information tidbits can easily
become a near-irresistible magnet for juror curiosity." Id.
338. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 59-170 and accompanying text.
340. See id.
341. See id.
342. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
343. See id.
344. See supra notes 289-301 and accompanying text.
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should use non-legalese, plain-English language that jurors can easily
comprehend. 345 Judges should illuminate for jurors the policy reasons
behind the prohibition. 3 4 6 The instruction should be repeated fre-
quently and provided to jurors in written form.3 4 7 The instruction
should also be complimented by additional preventative measures,
such as warnings in juror summons, voir dire questioning, and signed
declarations.348 The proposed instruction and increased preventative
measures "reflect the realities of the electronic age." 349
The adversary system must adapt to the "techno-savy" Twittering
juror. A new jury instruction must be adopted to prevent technology
from adversely affecting a litigant's right to a fair trial. It is a neces-
sary development in a gradually changing legal world, which now con-
tains jurors with handheld Internet devices and excessive social
networking tendencies.350 Twenty-first century instructions need to be
given to address twenty-first century technology.35' American courts
must silence the Twittering juror.
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345. See id.
346. See id.
347. See id.
348. See supra notes 304-11 and accompanying text.
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350. See Danzig, supra note 5. Experts suspect that courts will adopt updated rules of proce-
dure to "jive with" the rising issue of technology in the jury box. Id. Re-writing precautionary
juror instructions to include an explicit ban against technology use by jurors would be a moderni-
zation of rules similar to the recently updated Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that now include
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351. See Tooher, supra note 349.
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